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Article
Inventing Norms
WILLIAM HUBBARD
Patent law strives to promote the progress of technology by
encouraging invention. Traditionally, scholars contend that patent law
achieves this goal by creating financial incentives to invent in the form of
exclusive rights to new technology. This traditional view of invention,
however, fails to recognize that inventors are motivated by more than
money. Like most people, inventors are also motivated by social norms,
that is, shared normative beliefs favoring certain actions while disfavoring
others. This Article argues that many Americans embrace social norms
that favor and encourage successful invention. Because of these
"inventing norms" inventors enjoy enhanced personal satisfaction and are
esteemed by their friends, family, and peers. Importantly, patent law can
strengthen and shape inventing norms by, for example, identifying and
validating successful inventions. Patent scholars, however, have largely
ignored social norms that motivate people to invent and the effect ofpatent
law on these norms. This Article remedies this oversight by developing a
framework for incorporating inventing norms into traditional patent law
analysis.
ARTICLE CONTENTS
i. IN TRO D U CTIO N ................................................................................... 371
II. MOTIVATIONS TO INVENT .............................................................. 374
A. FINANCIAL REWARDS AND EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS .................................. 374
B. SOCIAL NORMS AND INVENTION ......................................................... 376
C. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO INVENTING NORMS .................................. 388
III. THE EFFECT OF PATENT LAW ON INVENTING NORMS ........... 390
A. PATENT LAW AND VALUE JUDGMENTS ............................................... 391
B. PATENT LAW AND INFORMATION ........................................................ 393
C. PATENT LAW AND SOCIAL MEANING .................................................. 394
D. PATENT LAW AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS .............................. 397
IV. INCORPORATING INVENTING NORMS INTO
PATENT LAW ANALYSES ................................................................ 403
A. CONFLICTS BETWEEN INVENTING NORMS
AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES .......................................................... 404
B. HARMONY BETWEEN INVENTING NORMS
AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES .......................................................... 408
C. INVENTING NORMS AND TRIVIAL FINANCIAL INCENTIVES .................. 410
V . C O N CLU SIO N ...................................................................................... 412
Inventing Norms
WILLIAM HUBBARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Michael Jackson dubbed himself the "King of Pop" and arguably
deserved the title. He released thirteen number one singles, won eighteen
Grammy Awards, and sold approximately 750 million records.' His
2Thriller album remains the best-selling album of all time. He was
inducted into the Rock & Roll Hall of fame three times: once as a member
of the Jackson 5, once as a solo artist, and once as a songwriter.' His
autobiography was a New York Times Best Seller. President Ronald
Reagan gave Jackson a Special Achievement Award for his efforts to
reduce drunk driving.5  President George H. W. Bush designated Jackson
as a "Point of Light Ambassador." 6  In light of his extraordinary
popularity, when Jackson died on June 25, 2009, his death dominated news
headlines for weeks. In light of these accomplishments, it is surprising that
many mainstream news sources highlighted a somewhat trivial aspect of
Jackson's career: he invented and patented a system for performing one
particular dance move on stage.7
. Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore Law School. For their insightful comments, I
thank Timothy Holbrook, Gregory Mandel, David Olson, Lucas Osbom, Eric Posner, Henry Smith,
Harry Surden, Peter Yu, and the participants at the Junior Faculty Forum at the University of Baltimore
Law School. I am grateful to Nicole Blondell for her excellent research assistance. All errors are mine.
This Article was produced with the support of a University of Baltimore Summer Research Fellowship.
SJEL D. LEWIS (JONES), MICHAEL JACKSON: THE KING OF POP 101-21 (2005); Mairi Mackay,
Michael Jackson Album Sales Soar, CNN.com (June 26, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-
26/entertainment/michael.jackson.album.salesljackson-s-albums-michael-jackson-sony-music? s-
PM:SHOWBIZ.
2 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 101-21.
3 Id. at 103.4 1d. at 114.
5Id. at 117.61d. at 111.
7 U.S. Patent No. 5,255,452 (filed June 29, 1992); see also Dan Vergano, "Smooth" Leaning
Move Really Was Patented, USA TODAY, July 1, 2009, at 2D; CBS Evening News (CBS television
broadcast July 7, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5130315n&tag-related;photovideo;
Law Students Study Jackson's Dance-Move Patent, NPR (July 7, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=106333912; Ki Mae Heussner, How MT Defied
Gravity: The Secret to "Smooth Criminal," ABC NEWS (June 27, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/MichaelJackson/story?id=794195 1&page= 1; Brian Palmer,
Michael Jackson, RIP, FAQ: Lunar Moonwalking, Child Custody, and Made-Up Words, SLATE (June
26, 2009, 6:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2221408/.
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The attention that his patent garnered following his death is puzzling.
The traditional view is that patent law promotes invention by creating
exclusive rights with economic value,8 but it is doubtful that Jackson
patented his invention to obtain financially lucrative exclusive rights.
Jackson's exclusive rights were exceedingly narrow, Fprotecting only the
use of special shoes in conjunction with a special stage. Moreover, even if
Jackson hoped to benefit financially from these exclusive rights, the media
attention that the patent received following Jackson's death still remains a
mystery because any pecuniary benefit from the patent would have been
trivial in comparison to Jackson's other successes. In accounts of
Jackson's death, would his fans really be interested to learn of his patent
because it was a financial asset? Explaining the media's focus on Michael
Jackson's patent requires a new, broader understanding of an inventor's
motivation to patent and the relationship of patent law to invention.'
Traditionally, scholars argue that patent law encourages inventors to
find new discoveries by rewarding successful invention with economically
valuable exclusive rights. These scholars contend that exclusive patent
rights are crucial to obtaining monetary reward from invention; without
exclusive rights, copying will dissipate any commercial advantage
stemming from the discovery. From this perspective, an inventor develops
a patentable invention only for the money."
The media's focus on Jackson's patent suggests that the traditional
' DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT
7 (2009) ("[T]he idea behind the patent system is simple: invention is a 'public good' because it is
expensive to invent but cheap to copy those inventions."); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 127 (4th ed. 2007) ("Patent law provides a market-
driven incentive to invest in innovation, by allowing the inventor to appropriate the full economic
rewards of her invention."); see also MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 158 (2008) (describing the traditional view of patent law); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 629 n. 11 (2002) (collecting numerous citations to "literature modeling intellectual
property in terms of rents and product markets," and stating that a complete list of such citations
"would be impossible here"); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357-
58, 377 (2010) (describing the "reward" of exclusive patent rights as a "dominant justificatory theor[y]
of patent law" that "largely motivates current patent doctrine"); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as
Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 470 (2008) ("[D]iscussions of
patent law and policy have for the most part remained rooted in the paradigm of commercial sale as
motivation for invention ... ").
9 U.S. Patent No. 5,255,452, supra note 7.
10 Some scholars distinguish "invention" and "innovation." See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmarm &
Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259 n.4 (2007) ("We use the term
innovation... to refer to the process of research, invention, and development and refinement of new
ideas."). Although this distinction is not important for this Article, I have avoided using the term
"innovation" where possible.
11 See, e.g., David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 183 (2009) (stating that failure to grant
exclusive patent rights will create "copycats [who] will ... drive down prices below the price at which
the inventor can recoup her research and development costs").
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explanation of patents is incomplete. Regardless of Jackson's reasons for
obtaining-his patent, the benefits Jackson received for the patent were not
merely the monetary value of his patent rights. Jackson also received
praise from the media, albeit posthumously. Indeed, while inventors can
be spurred to action by rewards of exclusive rights, those financial
inducements are not the only relevant rewards. Inventors, like all people,
also seek the rewards of complying with "social norms," that is, "societal
attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done
and what ought not to be done."'"
In particular, many Americans share what this Article calls "inventing
norms," which are social attitudes of approval for successful invention. As
a result, in addition to the financial benefits of exclusive rights, people
invent to obtain personal satisfaction as well as the respect and admiration
of others. 3 Indeed, "a long stream of [sociological] research has
documented that inventors are characterized by pecuniary as well as
nonpecuniary motives,"' 4 and these nonpecuniary motives include the
satisfaction of social norms.'5 Moreover, as argued below, patent rights
can help to strengthen and enforce inventing norms. As a result, the
benefits of obtaining a patent can exceed the monetary value of the
exclusive rights conferred by the patent. By overlooking social norms that
promote invention and the effects of patents on these norms, 16 the
traditional view of patent law omits an important aspect of motivations to
invent.
17
12 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996). Other
legal scholars have defined "norm" in various but highly similar ways. Eric Posner defines social norm
as a behavior that emerges when a group ascribes a social meaning to an action. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW
AND SOCIAL NoRMS 34 (2000). Similarly, Richard McAdams describes norms as "informal social
regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of
a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both." Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997).
13 See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence
of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787,
1832-34 (2008) (discussing the importance of social norms as incentives to create jokes).
14 Henry Sauermann & Wesley M. Cohen, What Makes Them Tick?: Employee Motives and Firm
Innovation, 56 MGMT. SCI. 2134, 2134 (2010); see also infra Section II.B.3 (discussing sociological
research regarding inventing). Satisfying social norms could have pecuniary effects, too. See infra
note 114 and accompanying text.
's Other nonpecuniary motives also encourage invention. Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the
Creative Process: Intellectual Property and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 2) (discussing intrinsic motivation). For example, people may
invent merely because they enjoy the creative act. As Yochai Benkler has observed, "[p]eople are
creative beings. They will play at creation if given an opportunity ...." Yochai Benkler, Coase's
Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 424 (2002).
16 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 13, at 1791 ("Although the law and social norms movement is
approximately two decades old, its insights have not yet penetrated deeply into the IP literature.").
17 POSNER, supra note 12, at 169 (noting that "common normative judgments in legal analysis
should take account of complexities of nonlegal regulation more often than they do"); Richard H.
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This Article provides an argument and framework for correcting the
omission of inventing norms from patent law analysis. Part II examines
motivations to invent, and argues that the financial rewards touted by the
traditional justification for patent law provide some incentive, but that
inventing norms also provide important incentives to invent. Part III
argues that patent law and social norms are interdependent and that patent
law defines, strengthens, and supports inventing norms in various ways.
Part IV argues that because of the interrelationship of patent law and
inventing norms, patent law analysis should expand to consider both the
financial effects of exclusive rights and the effects of social norms. This
Part provides a broader framework for patent law analysis by incorporating
both traditional and social-norms perspectives. In applying that framework
to current controversies in patent law, this Article argues, for example, that
the positive impact of inventing norms would be diminished by adopting
radical recommendations to abolish patent law altogether. Part V
concludes by summarizing and by identifying additional avenues for
research.
II. MOTIVATIONS TO INVENT
A. Financial Rewards and Exclusive Rights
The traditional view among legal scholars is that patents promote
invention by granting exclusive rights that help inventors profit financially
from their discoveries. 8 Absent legal protections, competitors may copy
new technology-in which case the benefits of an invention are
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 373 (2000) (recommending
that "economists make the consideration of the expressive consequences of law a standard component
of their models").
'8 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Although this Article focuses on the capacity of
patent law to encourage invention, commentators have proposed other functions for the patent system.
For example, patent law requires applicants to disclose significant information about their discoveries
in order to obtain a patent, see infra notes 199-211 and accompanying text, and this disclosure provides
technological information that can be used by subsequent inventors. Sichelman, supra note 8, at 377-
78; see also Jeanne Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REv. 539, 542 (2009) (analyzing the
disclosure function of patents); Timothy Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REv. 123,
125 (2006) ("Disclosure, therefore, is central to the patent system."). Edmund Kitch famously argued
that patents serve as "prospects" that encourage efficient use of existing discoveries. Edmund W.
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 266 (1977); see also F.
Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV.
697, 753 (2001) (contending that patent law serves not as an incentive for invention, but rather "to
facilitate commercialization of new goods and services"). Even the prospect theory of patent law,
however, is focused entirely on the impact of exclusive patent rights. At least one scholar has argued
that patents can serve a function conceptually distinct from the scope and duration of exclusive rights.
Clarisa Long has argued that patents serve as signals to sources of capital that the patent owner
(typically a business) engages in significant research and development. Long, supra note 8, at 628.
Reliable signaling is important for both economic and norm-based incentives. See infra Section III.D.
[Vol. 44:369
"externalized" to those copyists rather than being fully "internalized" by
the inventor. 19 As Thomas Jefferson noted almost two centuries ago:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking
power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively
possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it
is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every
one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.20
For example, if a person invented a paper clip with a new shape that was
more effective than the traditional paper clip, the inventor could not sell
the new paper clip without disclosing its shape to a buyer. Such a buyer
might then use a purchased paper clip as a template to copy the new-and-
improved paper clip.
The internalization of the benefits of an invention is, traditional
scholars argue, crucial to protecting investment in discovering the
invention.2' To recoup such an investment, an inventor must be able to
monetize the invention. One way for an inventor to monetize his
invention, is by selling a product incorporating the invention at a price that
reflects both the product's cost (labor, materials, etc.) and the investment in
research and development.22 For example, the inventor of a new design for
paper clips could sell the new paper clips at a price sufficiently above the
costs of production and marketing to recoup the investment in the redesign.
Similarly, an inventor could recoup an investment in invention by licensing
the new technology. 23 Absent some legal protection, however, neither
mechanism will ensure the recovery of investment in invention.
Competitors who are able to copy the product can undercut the inventor's
price (or a licensee's price) because the copies would not need to include a
portion of the development costs in their price. 24  A rational would-be
inventor would foresee these obstacles to recovering an investment in
invention, and, absent legal protection, forego investing any resources
whatsoever in invention.
19 Mark A Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 129, 129-30 (2004); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 9-16 (1971) (describing collective actions problems and public
goods).
20 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 333 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904).
21 MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 127; see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 8, at 7 (describing
invention as a "public good"); OLSON, supra note 19, at 9-16; Strandburg, supra note 8, at 475
(describing the need to recoup inventors' investment through sales).
22 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 97 (2008).
23 Id.
24 MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 12.
2011] INVENTING NOR&H9
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Patents prevent such a situation from arising because a patent gives an
inventor rights to exclude others from making, using, or selling an
invention.2 ' These rights allow an inventor to commercialize an invention
free from concern that competitors will copy it.26 In addition, the exclusive
rights of a patent apply even when there is no copying-independent
invention is no defense to a claim of patent infringement. 2' Because these
rights protect the returns on investments in invention, they provide
financial incentives to invent. Such potential financial reward undoubtedly
can affect behavior. Subsidizing (or taxing) certain conduct will often
make it occur more (or less) frequently. Corporations are particularly
subject to economic incentives, given the responsibilities of corporations to
enhance returns for their shareholders.
B. Social Norms and Invention
Though the economic benefits of exclusive patent rights are important,
they are not the whole story. Because people care about societal attitudes
of approval and disapproval concerning which actions and outcomes to
pursue and which to avoid, individual behavior is also shaped by social
norms.28  Etiquette, for example, is a system of norms. A person who
slurps his soup risks social sanction from fellow diners even though
slurping may be an effective way to cool soup. Other norms may be more
important to maintaining social order.29  For example, because the
enforcement of law is expensive, norms favoring lawful behavior are vital
to our society.30 Some norms are widely embraced but are satisfied by
only a comparatively small group of people-such as norms promoting
25 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). A patent also gives the owner the right to prevent another from
offering to sell an invention, or importing an invention into the United States. Id. When a patent is
infringed, however, a patent owner is not automatically entitled to injunctive relief. eBay v.
MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006).
26 Recent scholarship indicates, however, that copying is uncommon. See Christopher A.
Contropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1457, 1458 tbl.4 (2009)
(concluding, "copying is indeed rare in patent litigation").27 Id. at 1460. If independent invention were a defense, the initial inventor would not enjoy the
full benefit of the invention and therefore might invest inefficiently few resources in discovery. For
example, if the benefit of an invention were $200, investing $190 in discovering it would be efficient.
If independent invention were a defense to patent infringement, however, a first inventor could not
capture any portion of the $200 benefit accruing to an independent inventor. For example, the first
inventor might only receive half the benefit, that is, $100. A rational inventor would therefore invest
less in discovery than the invention is ultimately worth in total. See also Samson Vermont,
Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REv. 475, 484-89 (2006)
(describing a limited defense to patent infringement claims for subsequent independent invention).
28 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
29 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (arguing that social norms can displace law at times).30 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 916-17 (noting that obedience of the law is partly due to a
desire to maintain reputation).
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military heroism.
Attitudes of approval and disapproval can affect an individual's
valuation of a behavior in two respects. First, social norms can be
"internalized" so that a person feels guilt or pride if the behavior violates
or satisfies the social norm.3' For instance, a person who has internalized a
norm against lying may feel guilt following a lie even if the falsehood is
never detected. Such guilt may deter a person from lying. Second, social
norms may be "external. 32 Richard McAdams has noted that behavior can
be affected by the pursuit of "the respect and admiration of ... peers. 33
Likewise, Eric Posner has argued that "much of our sense of
accomplishment and well-being comes from our considered approval or
rejection of values to which others expect us to conform ... Thus, a
person may give up a lucrative career as a lawyer in order to be a judge
because judges are highly respected. 35  Because the enforcement of
externalized norms depends on the capacity of people to learn of one's
behavior, a person may seek to publicize behavior that satisfies a norm or
hide behavior that violates a norm. One example of such publicizing of
norm compliance is the practice of universities naming buildings after
generous alumni donors. The name of the building broadcasts a donor's
exceptional compliance with norms of success, generosity, loyalty, and
school spirit. Similarly, soldiers who display exceptional bravery receive
medals and other commendations.
Numerous social norms can affect invention. Some norms may
support invention, such as norms favoring hard work,3 6 and norms among
31 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 997 (1995); see
also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 936 (noting that internal mental states can be complex). Internalized
social norms are similar to what psychologists describe as "introjected regulation," which involves
motivation premised on "internal pressure [that] arises out of a sense of externally related obligation."
Mandel, supra note 15, (manuscript at 9).
32 Some scholars have argued that "people gradually internalize norms to which they initially
adhere for reputational reasons." POSNER, supra note 12, at 44; see also McAdams, supra note 12, at
380-81 (explaining that people follow behavioral norms in order to adhere to societal obligations).
33 McAdams, supra note 12, at 356; see also POSNER, supra note 12, at 41 ("[P]eople conform to
social norms because they care about their reputation .... ); Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2149 (1996) ("[P]eople in social relationships care about others' opinions of
them ...."); McAdams, supra note 17, at 343 (noting that people may act to obtain the approval of
others); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2032 (1996)
("People act in accordance with their perceptions of what other people think."); Sunstein, supra note
12, at 916 ("Social norms are a key determinant in reputational benefit or cost.").
34 POSNER, supra note 12, at 208. McAdams has noted that "[a]n individual may value approval
intrinsically because it satisfies a preference for esteem or instrumentally because it helps to achieve
other ends." McAdams, supra note 17, at 343.
35 See McAdams, supra note 12, at 342, 355-57 (discussing the importance of esteem in social
norms).
36 See Scott A. Shane, Why Do Some Societies Invent More than Others?, 7 J. BUS. VENTURING
29, 29 (1992) (concluding that individualism and lack of power distance explain differences in national
rates of inventiveness); see also Benkler, supra note 15, at 378 (noting that humans are motivated by
2011] INVENTING NORMS
scientists encouraging the sharing of research results.37 Other social norms
may hamper invention. 38  For example, social norms based on erroneous
stereotypes may dissuade women and minorities from pursuing careers in
science and invention. 39  As an empirical matter, demonstrating the net
effect of these social norms on invention is difficult and requires further
study.4°
Although many social norms can impact invention, this Article focuses
on "inventing norms," which are norms that endorse invention itself as
something that "ought to be done." 4' By definition, inventing norms
promote invention, at least to the extent that people embrace them. Despite
this salutary effect of inventing norms, patent scholars have generally
ignored these norms. The following subsections argue that inventing
norms are present in two overlapping social groups: general society and
42technologically sophisticated colleagues.
1. Inventing Norms in General Society
One challenge in analyzing social norms is identifying them. Because
norms are enforced through non-legal mechanisms, they are not usually
codified.43 Evidence of norms is often reflected in circumstantial evidence
of behavior patterns. As a result, they "are hard to describe; they are
fuzzy; they drift."" Moreover, distinguishing internalized social "attitudes
of approval and disapproval" vis-A-vis individual personal preferences is
different rewards); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology ofintellectual Property, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441,
1462-63 (2010) (describing the work and time required to produce a creative product); Sauermann &
Cohen, supra note 14, at 2136 (describing the difficulty in observing the work necessary to produce a
creative product); cf. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 13, at 1833-34 (noting that social norms may
provide an incentive to develop new jokes).
37 Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary Between
Academic andIndustry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 2239 (2009).
38 Social norms against failure may deter would-be inventors from pursuing risky projects. See
DAVID BROOKS, ON PARADISE DRIVE 42 (2004) (asserting that the modem American suburb "is not a
social order oriented around creativity, novelty, and excitement").
39 Studies demonstrate that women are rarely patentees. See, e.g., John P. Walsh & Sadao
Nagaoka, Who Invents?: Evidence from the Japan-US Inventor Survey 9 (RIETI discussion paper
series, 09-E-034, 2009), available at http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dpl09eO34.pdf (reporting
that only five percent of U.S. patentees are women); see also GAMBARDELLA ET AL., THE VALUE OF
EUROPEAN PATENTS: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN INVENTORS 20 (2005), available at
http://www.alfonsogambardella.itPATVALFinalReport.pdf (reporting that only 2.82% of European
patentees are female).
40 Financial incentives exhibit a similar indeterminacy because improved financial incentives in
one context raise the opportunity costs of another.
41 Sunstein, supra note 12, at 914.
42 Olav Sorenson & Jasjit Singh, Science, Social Networks and Spillovers, 14 INDUS. &
INNOVATION 219, 220 (2007) (noting that "inventors, like most people, primarily interact with others
that live and work in close proximity to them").
43 Some norms, however, may be codified. For example, rules of etiquette are compiled into
books. See, e.g., PEGGY POST, EMILY POST'S ETIQUETTE (17th ed. 2004).
44 POSNER, supra note 12, at 221.
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difficult. Nevertheless, considerable evidence indicates that there is, in the
words of one commentator, a "uniquely American innovative spirit.'"' At
the very least, it appears that many people share norms favoring invention
and that norms opposing invention are rare.
Studies related to national pride indicate that social norms lauding
invention are present in the United States.46 In a study conducted in 1995
and 1996, more than 30,000 people from twenty-four different countries
were asked whether they were "very proud," "proud," "not very proud," or
"not proud at all" of their countries' scientific and technological
achievements.17 Fifty-one percent of American interviewees declared they
were "very proud" of U.S. scientific and technological achievements.48 In
other English-speaking countries, only thirty-seven percent of interviewees
were "very proud" of such achievements. Americans also displayed far
less pride in other types of achievements. Only twenty-nine percent of
American subjects stated that they were "very proud" of U.S. economic
accomplishments, and only thirty-one percent of American subjects stated
they were "very proud" of U.S. achievements in art and literature. 49 The
study concluded that "Americans take more pride in science and
technology than do the citizens of any other nation in the study."50
The inclusion of invention in the U.S. Constitution establishes
invention as a core American value. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution-the so-called "IP Clause"--gives Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries." 5'
45 Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Does the Wall Street Journal Understand Patent Law?,
PATENTLYO (Mar. 1, 2006), http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2006/03/does the wall s.html.
There is some evidence that inventing norms are different in the United States than in other places. For
example, academic science and commercial invention have closer ties in the United States than in
Europe. See BROOKS, supra note 38, at 80 ("Three-quarters of recent years' Nobel laureates in
economics and the sciences live and work in the United States."); Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David,
Toward a New Economics of Science, 23 RES. POL'Y 487, 489 (1994). But see POSNER, supra note 12,
at 146 (noting that discussions of norms can suffer from "exaggeration and myth-making").
46 
ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 296 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973).47 M.D.R. Evans & Jonathan Kelley, National Pride in the Developed World: Survey Data from
24 Nations, 14 INT'L J. OF PUB. OPINION RES. 303, 312 tbl. 1 (2002).
41 Id. at 312. It is likely that the success of the United States in developing technology has
contributed to this pride. Id. at 309.49 Id. at 312.
5
o Id. at 316 (emphasis added); see also SCOTT BERKUN, THE MYTHS OF INNOVATION 113 (Mary
Treseler ed., 2010) ("Americans hold ingenuity to be one of the best kinds of goodness ... .
51 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. In The Federalist Papers, James Madison noted:
The utility of this power, will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The
right to useful, inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.
The public good fully coincides in both, cases with the claims of individuals.
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The IP Clause is unusual in that, unlike some other powers granted in
Section 8, the IP Clause not only grants Congress a "Power," namely the
power to "secur[e] for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right
to their ... Discoveries," but also explicitly states the policy goal for the
exercise of that power, that is, "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." In other clauses in Section 8, the policy goals for the grants
of congressional powers are largely implicit.52
National leaders, from the time of James Madison,53 George
Washington,54 Alexander Hamilton,55 and Thomas Jefferson,56 to the
present, often lauded the role and importance of invention. Fifteen of the
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). Apart from such statements by Madison and others, see
infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text, there is little contemporaneous information regarding the
reasons for including this clause in the Constitution. The provision was adopted without disagreement
or debate. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3242 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). At least one
scholar has suggested that delegates to the Constitutional Convention may have focused their attention
on more contentious issues. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution,
2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 26-27 (1994). Nevertheless, the inclusion of this provision in the Constitution
should not be dismissed. The committee at the Constitutional Convention that drafted the clause
strived "[t]o insert essential principles only." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 137 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) (recounting the explanation of Edmund Randolph).
52 For example, the Interstate Commerce Clause merely provides that Congress shall have the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This
clause does not suggest a goal for regulation. Certain other clauses in Section 8 suggest a goal for the
use of congressional power. For instance, Clause 6 gives Congress the power to "provide for the
Punishment of counterfeiting." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. The goal of this power is implicit: to use
punishment to reduce counterfeiting of "Securities and current Coin of the United States." Id.
53 See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
54 George Washington lauded invention in the nation's first state of the union address in 1790:
The advancement of agriculture, commerce and manufactures by all proper
means, will not, I trust, need recommendation; but I cannot forbear intimating to
you the expediency of giving effectual encouragement as well to the introduction
of new and useful inventions from abroad, as to the exertions of skill and genius
in producing them at home ....
Nor am I less persuaded that you will agree with me in opinion that there is
nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the promotion of science
and literature. Knowledge is in every country the surest basis of public
happiness.
President George Washington, State of the Union Address (Jan. 8, 1790) (transcript available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2943 1).
" As treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton stated in his Report on Manufactures, "[t]he
propriety of stimulating by rewards, the invention and introduction of useful improvements, is admitted
without difficulty." Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures, in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITuTION 41 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
56 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 20, at 334. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that Jefferson's statements regarding patents are "worthy of note."
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966); see also infra note 80 and accompanying text
(discussing the importance of inventing norms to Jefferson's own inventing).
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eighteen most recent presidents have celebrated invention, science, or
technological progress in their inaugural addresses or State of the Union
speeches.57 Congress has designated February 11 as "National Inventors'
Day., 58  President Reagan described inventors as "the keystone of the
technological progress that is so vital to the economic, environmental, and
social well-being of this country., 59  More recently, President Obama
described invention as the "first step in winning the future., 60 Every year
the President of the United States awards the National Medal of Science
and the National Medal of Technology and Innovation to exceptional
scientists and inventors.6' The U.S. Patent Office, which is an agency
under the executive branch, also oversees a National Inventors Hall of
Fame and Museum.62
Popular media also demonstrate the existence of inventing norms.
Advertisers frequently tout their products to consumers as "new,"
"improved," "patented," or "patent pending., 63 Time recently quipped that
57 The presidents who did not laud invention or technological progress in their inaugural
addresses or State of the Union Addresses are Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman, and Lyndon B.
Johnson. In his inaugural speech in 2009 President Obama lauded the "inventive[ness]" of the minds
of the American people and promised to "restore science to its rightful place and [to] wield
technology's wonders." President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/).
58 See, e.g., Designating February 11, 1983, "National Inventors' Day," Pub. L. No. 97-198, 96
Stat. 120 (1982). In dedicating this day to inventors, Congress highlighted "the important role played
by inventors in promoting progress in the useful arts and ... the invaluable contribution of inventors to
the welfare of our people." Id. Not coincidentally, February 11 is also the birthday of Thomas Edison.
RANDALL E. STROSS, THE WIZARD OF MENLO PARK: How THOMAS ALVA EDISON INVENTED THE
WORLD 3 (2007).
59 Proclamation No. 5013, 48 Fed. Reg. 1677 (Jan. 12, 1983). The federal government also gives
tax benefits to patentees. Long, supra note 8, at 663 n.108.
60 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011) (transcript available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=88928).
61 These medals "represent the highest honors for achievement in science & technology bestowed
by the President of the United States." About the Medals, NAT'L SCI. & TECH. MEDALS FOUND.,
http://www.nationalmedals.org/medals/index.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2010); The Laureates, NAT'L
Sci. & TECH. MEDALS FOUND., http://www.nationalmedals.org/medals/laureates.php (last visited Oct.
28,2011).
62 Welcome to the National Inventors Hall of Fame and Museum, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/opa/museum.jsp (last visited Sept. 15, 2011). Every year,
the Hall of Fame inducts new members, whose names are prominently featured in the museum. An
explicit requirement of being inducted into the Hall of Fame is that the inductee must hold a U.S.
Patent for the invention. Nomination for Induction into the National Inventors Hall of Fame, U.S.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.invent.org/pdfs/ihof.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).63 ROBERT C. DORR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS 216 (2d ed. 1995) ("[T]he words patent pending may have substantial
psychological or marketing value."); see also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 925-26 (discussing
advertisers attempts to utilize social norms). In fact, the Patent Act encourages patent owners to
provide "notice to the public that [a product] is patented, either by fixing thereon the word 'patent' or
the abbreviation 'pat.', together with the number of the patent .... 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
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"[i]nnovation is as American as apple pie." 64  Indeed, some inventors
obtain celebrity status. 65 Alexander Graham Bell is famous for inventing
the telephone.66 When he died, the United States and Canada observed a
moment of telephonic silence. For one minute, there were no calls on
thirteen million telephones.67 Conversely, some celebrities obtain patents
even though those patents likely provide relatively little financial reward.
Celebrity patentees include Abraham Lincoln,68 Eddie Van Halen,69
Marlon Brando,70 and, as indicated above, Michael Jackson. 71  Public
praise, medals, and museums all indicate the presence of general social
norms favoring invention.72
Finally, empirical studies of juries confirm that the general public
lauds inventors. These studies reveal that in patent infringement lawsuits
juries disproportionately find in favor of inventors.73 Attorneys involved in
these cases attribute this success to the jurors' perceptions of inventors:
"Many attorneys believe that juries are mesmerized by the inventor's story
and tend to favor the [inventor]. Juries respond well to descriptions of the
inventive process and the inventor's flash of genius or slow methodical
trial and error.",74 In short, "juries appear to love inventors."'7 5
64 Fareed Zakaria, Innovate Better, TIME, June 13, 2011, at 30, 30.
65 SCOTT BERKUN, THE MYTHS OF INNOVATION 141 (2010) ("In our religions, histories, and
mythologies, we hold innovators to be great heroes ... ").
66 U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (filed Feb. 14, 1876); see also CHARLOTTE GRAY, RELUCTANT
GENIUS: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE PASSION FOR INVENTION 117-38 (2006).
67 GRAY, supra note 66, at 423; Randy Alfred, Aug. 4, 1922: For Whom the Bell Tolls Not,
WIRED (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2010/08/0804alexander-graham-bell-
funeral-silence.
68 Abraham Lincoln is the only United States president to obtain a patent. WILLIAM ROSEN, THE
MOST POWERFUL IDEA IN THE WORLD 322 (2010); see also Thomas Astebro, The Return to
Independent Invention: Evidence of Unrealistic Optimism, Risk Seeking or Skewness Loving?, 113
ECON. J. 226, 237 (2003). U.S. Patent No. 6,469 was issued to Abraham Lincoln on May 22, 1849.
ROSEN, supra note 68, at 322. Presidential Patent Model and Drawing on Display, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE (Feb. 17, 1998), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/1998/98-03.jsp.
69 U.S. Patent No. 4,656,917 (filed Apr. 14 1987).
70 U.S. Patent No. 6,812,392 (filed Nov. 2, 2004).
71 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
72 Similar norms may exist regarding the creation of expressive works, which are often protected
through copyright law. For example, musicians may be motivated not only by financial gain but also
by the rewards of fame and critical acclaim. Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual
Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1312 (2003). Likewise,
"many artists create from an endogenous desire rather than external motivations ...." Ben Depoorter
& Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV.
1127, 1138 (2005).
73 See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 386 (2001) (reporting that patentees prevail in sixty-eight percent of
cases tried to juries and prevail in only fifty-one percent of bench trials).
74 Id. at 372.
75 Id.; see also Jonathon Taylor Reavill, Note, Tipping the Balance: Hilton Davis and the Shape of
Equity in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 366 (1996) ("[J]uries also tend to
idealize inventors."); Barry S. Wilson, Comment, Patent Invalidity and the Seventh Amendment: Is the
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2. Inventing Norms in Technical Subgroups
Inventing norms are particularly strong among technological
sophisticates, including both inventors and their technological peers. 76 For
example, Thomas Edison once said: "One might think that the money
value of an invention constitutes its reward to the man who loves his work.
But ... I continue to find my greatest pleasure, and so my reward, in the
work that precedes what the world calls success. 77 Indeed, the decision
by some inventors not to obtain financially rewarding patent rights to their
discoveries suggests that inventing norms are important. Following
Benjamin Franklin's invention of the Franklin stove, he eschewed patent
protection, stating later that "we should be glad of an Opportunity to serve
others by any Invention of ours. 78 Likewise, Thomas Jefferson invented
an improved plow that won international acclaim,79 but did not patent it
because he considered patent rights to be a "public ... embarrassment." 80
Jonas Salk invented the polio vaccine, but did not patent it.8 The
inventors of gene splicing also did not want to patent their discovery.
Numerous winners of the Nobel Prize have similarly avoided patenting
their discoveries,83 while other inventors have patented their work only "to
ensure its being made available for public use.'84 Indeed, inventors invent
even though the decision to invent is financially costly and provides less
Jury Out?, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1787, 1787 n.4 (1997) ("Lay juries may be inherently biased towards
the patentee because they hold the U.S. Patent Office in high regard.").76 See McAdams, supra note 12, at 389 (noting that members of a group often "value the esteem
of fellow members more highly than that of strangers"); see also Hasen, supra note 33, at 2149-51
("[P]eople in social relationships care about others' opinions of them .... ). Inventors may also enjoy
inventing because they simply enjoy the intellectual challenge or the creative endeavor. See supra note
15 and accompanying text.77 MICHAEL GELB & SARAH MILLER CALDICOTT, INNOVATE LIKE EDISON 48 (2007).
78 BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 72 (1967).79 DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON'S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF CYBERSPACE
195-96 (2009).
80 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966); see also POST, supra note 79, at 196 n.9;
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 20, at 334.
81 JANE S. SMITH, PATENTING THE SUN 220 (1990). Salk may have believed that he could not
patent his vaccine. Lawyers had advised Salk that his invention could not be patented "since neither
the processes nor the materials Salk used were new discoveries." Id. Regardless of whether Salk
believed patenting was impossible, he did not publicly rely on this legal advice in explaining why he
would not pursue a patent. When asked about patent protection on national television, Salk replied,
"There is no patent. Could you patent the sun?" Id. at 338.
82 Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 93 (1999). Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer invented gene splicing at
Stanford University. Id. Ultimately, at the "strenuous urging" of Stanford, Cohen and Boyer patented
their discovery. Id.
83 Id. at 94. Yochai Benkler has noted that in certain information production activities, "[s]ome
contributors have made billions, while some ... have earned nothing but honor." Benkler, supra note
15, at 440.
84 MERTON, supra note 46, at 275 (emphasis added).
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financial reward than other investment opportunities. 85 By one estimate,
"[i]nventors typically forgo more than one-third of their lifetime
earnings. 86
Social norms favoring the discovery of new ideas have also been well-
documented in academic science.87 Robert Merton, one of the founders of
the sociology of science, observed that scientists adhere to norms regarding
"priority." Under those norms, "recognition and esteem accrue to those
who have ... made genuinely original contributions to the common stock
of knowledge. 88 To contribute to this "common stock," one must add
knowledge that was previously unknown, "[f]or it is through originality, in
greater or smaller increments, that knowledge advances., 89 Having made
discoveries, scientists often obtain esteem when their discoveries,
including natural laws, mathematical constants, heavenly bodies, and
animals, are named after their discoverers. 90 Indeed, scientists are often
powerfully motivated by the desire for esteem.9' As Charles Darwin once
stated, "[m]y love of natural science has been much aided by the ambition
to be esteemed by my fellow naturalists. 92  Many scientists thus exhibit
"an unquenched thirst for original discovery and ensuing praise." 93
Similar inventing norms exist among private industry-in part because
there are often close connections between academic science and industry.94
Frequently, inventors are former members of scientific academies that have
85 See Astebro, supra note 68, at 227 (arguing that many low value inventions are identifiable ex
ante, yet inventors persist in trying to commercialize them).
86 ROSEN, supra note 68, at 122-23; see also Astebro, supra note 68, at 237 ("[Fifty percent] of
inventors with very poor quality ideas continued to pursue efforts even when the paid advice strongly
argued against it."); cf. Garon, supra note 72, at 1313-14 ("[S]uccessfiil and unsuccessful authors may
have elected to forego more predictable rewards for the incentives that arise from copyright's
protection of exclusive rights.").
87 Dasgupta & David, supra note 45, at 491.
88 MERTON, supra note 46, at 293; see also Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and
Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REv. 217, 226 (2006)
(discussing the benefits of academic freedom to ideas and research); Dasgupta & David, supra note 45,
at 498 ("[P]riority of discovery or development is the basis for legitimate reputation-building
claims...."); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 183 (1987) (discussing the scientific reward structure); Rai, supra note 82,
at 92 ("[P]erhaps the strongest norm is that of invention itself."). Merton also documented norms
regarding the sharing of information among academics. MERTON, supra note 46, at 273-75.
89 MERTON, supra note 46, at 293.
90 See id at 297-305 (noting the practice of naming discoveries after scientists).
91 Id. at 293; Jeremy M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System Revealed, 33
J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 75 (2004).
92 MERTON, supra note 46, at 293 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
93 Id. at 320; see also Sorenson & Singh, supra note 42, at 220 ("[Scientists] do indeed wish to
disseminate their discoveries widely to gain recognition.").
94 Strandburg, supra note 37, at 2254 ("Industry scientists have many of the same preferences for
participation in research that academic scientists do."). Some scholars have described science and
technology as "interrelated areas of study." Dasgupta & David, supra note 45, at 489.
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joined private industry. 95 The transfer of scientific personnel from the
academy into applied technology is "potentially the most important and
salutary among the mechanisms available for effecting knowledge
transfers" from academic research centers to private enterprises.96  This
transfer likely includes the transfer of social norms. In addition, this
collaboration between industry researchers and academic scientists is
increasing, so there will be more opportunities for private researchers to
encounter academic norms.97  Indeed, "peer recognition may be
increasingly important as a metric for private sector scientists' success. 98
A recent advertisement by the computer chip manufacturer Intel
illustrates the role of inventing norms among technical groups.99 The
commercial opens with a man walking in slow motion through a doorway.
Hard-hitting rock music begins to play. Incongruously, the man wears a tie
and a sweater vest. He is middle aged, has a mustache, and does not
appear to be particularly tall, athletic, or handsome. Nevertheless, the
people in the room turn to him and their faces brighten, revealing a mixture
of elation and hysteria. The man points both index fingers at the adoring
crowd. Women begin to scream, although there is no sound other than the
sound of guitars and drums. Text appears on the screen, identifying the
man as "Ajay Bhatt co-inventor of the USB." Bhatt winks and nods his
head, while a man in the background unbuttons his shirt to reveal a t-shirt
with Bhatt's picture on it.' ° Bhatt pours himself some coffee while the
crowd continues to adore him. Bhatt signs autographs, and onlookers
photograph Bhatt with their mobile phones. The screen turns blue and text
appears: "Our rock stars aren't like your rock stars." In certain technical
circles, successful inventors are, in a sense, rock stars.
95 See Dasgupta & David, supra note 45, at 511 ("[P]rivate producers ...transfer scientific
personnel from the academy to their [private industry]."); Strandburg, supra note 37, at 2254
(discussing the relationship between academic and industry scientists). One difference between science
and industry, however, may be that academic scientists may be less likely to claim exclusive rights to
their discoveries through patenting. Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 182, 203. Alternatively, scientists
may patent their discoveries, but not assert their exclusive rights. Strandburg, supra note 37, at 2257.
96 Dasgupta & David, supra note 45, at 511.
97 Strandburg, supra note 37, at 2256, 2260, 2264; see also Bagley, supra note 88, at 217-18
(noting that patent license revenues for universities increased eightfold from 1991 to 2004).
98 Grushcow, supra note 91, at 75 n.3 1. In addition, inventors may rely on scientific literature in
developing their inventions. See GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 39, at 30 (finding that
approximately fifty-eight percent of inventors rated scientific literature "important" as a source of
innovation).
99 Sponsors of Tomorrow-Rock Star (Intel Commercial 2009), available at
http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/sponsors-of-tomorrow/sot-ad-rockstar-video.htmlwapkw=
rockstar tv ad (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
100 Intel later offered 100 of these t-shirts as prizes in a contest. Michael Brito, Ajay Bhatt T-Shirt
Give-a-Away, INTEL (June 1, 2009), http://scoop.intel.com/ajaybhatt-t-shirt give-a-away.
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3. Inventor Surveys and Inventing Norms
Sociological surveys exploring the motivations of inventors
corroborate the existence and importance of inventing norms.' 0l For
example, these studies suggest that internalized inventing norms provide
substantial incentives to invent. One study asked inventors, "[w]hat
motives or incentives cause you to invent?" 102 The most common answer
in this study was "[l]ove of inventing.'' 10 3 Similarly, in a study conducted
in 2007, more than eighty-six percent of inventors in the United States
responded that "[s]atisfaction from solving technical problems" was at
least "moderately important" in motivating their efforts to discover their
inventions.'0 4 This response was, by a considerable margin, the most
commonly identified motivation for invention. Another important
motivation identified by the inventors was "[s]atisfaction from contributing
[to] science."' 0 5 Similarly, in a study published in 2010, inventors were
asked to identify benefits that would be important "[w]hen thinking about a
job.'0 6  The most frequently identified attractive workplace attribute was
"intellectual challenge."'
10 7
Sociological surveys also demonstrate the presence of externally
enforced inventing norms: Inventors invent to obtain the respect and
admiration of their peers. 0 8 In one early study asking inventors to identify
"motives or incentives ... to invent," many of the respondents identified
"prestige" as a motive to invent. 0 9 In another study, more than thirty-six
percent of inventors stated that "prestige" and "reputation" were at least
"moderately important" motivations supporting their inventions.10
101 Sauermann & Cohen, supra note 14, at 2135 (discussing intrinsic and extrinsic motivations).
102 JOSEPH ROSSMAN, INDUSTRIAL CREATIVITY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INVENTOR 152 (1964).
103 Id. at 152 tbl.9.
104 Walsh & Nagaoka, supra note 39, at 22, 61 fig.2 1.
105 Id. at 61 fig.21 (reporting that 62.4% of American inventors were motivated by this factor).
106 Sauermann & Cohen, supra note 14, at 2137.
107 Id. at 2138 tbl.1, 2151. Studies of inventors in other countries have produced similar results.
For example, in a survey of more than 9000 European inventors, the most important motivator for
invention was "[s]atisfaction to show that something was technically possible." GAMBARDELLA ET AL.,
supra note 39, at 36.
108 Peer approval may be particularly important for subsequent invention, as many patents issued
today list multiple inventors. See GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 39, at 26 fig.4.1 (showing the
percentage of patents with more than one inventor for different countries in the European Union).
Those who are respected may be more likely to be invited to collaborate. See MIHALY
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 227,
283, 334 (1996) (discussing the importance of prestige to creative people).
109 ROSSMAN, supra note 102, at 152.
110 Walsh & Nagaoka, supra note 39, at 61. European inventors are also substantially motivated
by prestige. In a recent survey, European inventors considered "[p]restige/reputation" to be the second
most important motivator for invention; "[s]atisfaction to show that something [was] technically
possible" was the primary motivation. GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 39, at 36 tbl.5. 1. In the
United Kingdom, "[p]restige/reputation" was the most important motivator for invention. Id.
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Significantly, this study compared the responses of U.S. inventors with
those of more than 3600 Japanese inventors."' Japanese inventors and
U.S. inventors responded similarly regarding many motivations to
invent,'1 2 but were markedly different regarding one factor: "US inventors
rate prestige/reputation (social motivations) relatively highly among all
motivations, while this motivation ranks relatively low among Japanese
inventors .... ,,113
Finally, sociological studies indicate that financial rewards to invention
are often less important than non-pecuniary rewards, including the
satisfaction of inventing norms.' 14 One study identified "[f]inancial gain"
as the third most important incentive to invent, behind "[1]ove of
inventing" and "[d]esire to improve" existing technology. 1 5  In another
study, only 22.1% of U.S. inventors responded that "[m]onetary rewards"
were "moderately important" in motivating their invention." 6 In contrast,
36.8% of those inventors stated that "prestige" and "reputation" were
important incentives to invent. 17 This study also identified motivations to
invent that were tangentially related to monetary rewards, such as
"[g]enerating value for my firm," which more than seventy-eight percent
of inventors considered an important incentive. 18 Nevertheless, even that
indirect financial reward was less important than the satisfaction of internal
goals. In this study, the most commonly stated incentive was
"[s]atisfaction from solving techn[ological] problems.1"9
These studies indicate that widely shared norms encourage inventors to
invent. Some of these norms may be internally applied, such as the
enhanced satisfaction that an inventor feels from pursuing a "love of
inventing." Other norms, however, provide external benefits, including the
respect and admiration of peers. Significantly, these norms-based
incentives to invent can be more influential than some pecuniary incentives
to invent. Nonetheless, even when pecuniary benefits are more
. Walsh & Nagaoka, supra note 39, at 4.
... Id. at 22-23, 61 fig.21.
113 Id. at 23.
114 Moreover, even these financial motivations may be affected by inventing norms because these
norms provide both non-pecuniary and pecuniary incentives to invent. For example, a successful
inventor may obtain the admiration of peers (a non-pecuniary reward) and that admiration could lead to
additional job opportunities (a pecuniary reward). In contrast, the traditional justification of patent law
focuses exclusively on pecuniary rewards for inventing, that is, the economic value of exclusive patent
rights.
115 ROSSMAN, supra note 102, at 152 tbl.9.
116 Walsh & Nagaoka, supra note 39, at 22, 61 fig.21.
17 1d at61 fig.21.
118 Id.
120 Cf Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 72, at 1139 ("Empirical research on legitimacy reveals
that norm-based factors are sometimes stronger determinants of behavior than formal sanctions.").
Non-pecuniary incentives to invent also impact European inventors more than pecuniary rewards. In a
20111 INVENTINVG NORMS
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
influential, non-pecuniary incentives can still play a role.
C. Potential Objections to Inventing Norms
This section responds to two potential objections to the claim that
inventor motivation depends in part on social norms. The first potential
objection is that, even if social norms affect the behavior of people, the
impact of social norms is irrelevant because most patents are owned by
corporations, 12' and corporations are indifferent to social norms. Recent
empirical data demonstrates, however, that corporate management may
obtain patents in part to "[e]nhance company reputation/product image,"
thus suggesting that corporate leadership can be affected by inventing
norms even if compliance with norms is simply a way of increasing
prestige and thus profits. 22 Moreover, although many corporations obtain
patents to acquire exclusive rights,123 corporations rely on people to invent.
By law, patent ownership begins with the inventor. 24  Corporations
comprehensive study of more than 9000 European inventors, "[mlonetary rewards" was the fourth most
frequently identified incentive to invent. GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 39, at 17, 36 tbl.S.1.
European inventors considered the following non-pecuniary incentives to be the two most important:
"[s]atisfaction to show that something is technically possible" and "[p]restige/reputation." Id.
121 Corporations own eighty percent of all U.S. patents. Long, supra note 8, at 636 (internal
citation omitted).
22 Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of
the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1299 fig.2 (2009); accord Wesley M.
Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 18 figs.7 & 8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7555, 2000), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-214952 (reporting that a survey found that many
firms patent to "enhance reputation"); see also GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 39, at 35, 36 tbl,5.1
(reporting that European companies sometimes obtain patents to improve their "reputation").
Entrepreneurs in one study considered reputational effects to be more important than other significant
motivations to patent. Graham et al., supra, at 1301 fig.3. Indeed, for software companies, reputation
effects were the second most important reason to patent. Id. These reputation effects may have a
financial component because a better "reputation" and "product image" may lead to greater sales. See
Cohen et al., supra, at 8 n.41 (suggesting that some inventors may use a patent's reputation-enhancing
effect as a basis to sell the firm outright). Nevertheless, even if companies' focus on reputation has
financial benefits, this justification for patenting is distinct from the assertion of exclusive rights.
123 See GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 39, at 43 (reporting that "organisations patent mainly
because they seek exclusive rights .... "); Graham et al., supra note 122, at 1299 fig.2 (reporting that
companies obtain patents to "[p]revent others from copying [their] products or services"); Cohen et al.,
supra note 122, at 17 figs.7 & 8 (reporting that prevention of copying was the most frequent response
when companies were asked to indicate their reasons for applying for a patent).
124 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188,
2195 (2011) ("[A]lthough others may acquire an interest in an invention, any such interest-as a
general rule-must trace back to the inventor."); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever
invents... may obtain a patent .... ); id. § 152 (stating that a patent can issue to the assignee of a
patent application); Long, supra note 8, at 636 n.32 ("Only individuals-not corporations-may be
inventors."). In this respect, patent law is markedly different from copyright law, which states that a
work made in the course of employment is owned by the company ab initio. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) ("The
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and... owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.").
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typically obtain patents through assignment by employees. 25 Because of
this central role of individuals, it is necessary to consider not only
corporate profit motives but also "individual-level motives," particularly
inventing norms. 
126
These motives to invent can be crucial because employee-inventors
typically receive little, if any, direct financial reward for their
discoveries.1 27 Many employment contracts obligate employees to assign
later-developed inventions to their employer. 128  Even without such a
contractual provision, common-law default rules in many circumstances
require employees to assign patents to their employers, particularly if the
employee's job focuses on research and development. 129  Some
corporations give bonuses to employees who obtain patents, but many do
not.1 30 Although employees may worry about job security or advancement,
"corporate [research] personnel generally receive their salary whether or
not a particular line of research pans out."
131
The second potential objection to this Article's claim concerning
inventing norms is that even if inventors pursue their discoveries for non-
financial reasons, those reasons are unrelated to social norms. Instead,
inventors invent to satisfy their personal preferences. They simply enjoy
the process of discovery and invention and would do the same thing if
there were no social norm favoring invention. Just as some people enjoy
cooking or gardening, some people enjoy being inventors. 132 Inventors, it
seems, may be divinely called to their work.
This potential criticism clearly fails to address norms under which
inventors are respected and esteemed by their peers, which are inherently
interpersonal and thus cannot reflect merely one inventor's valuation of
invention. Moreover, even internal preferences may stem from social
125 Long, supra note 8, at 636 n.32.
126 Sauermann & Cohen, supra note 14, at 2134-35.
127 INTELLECTUAL PROP. OWNERS ASS'N, EMPLOYEE INVENTOR COMPENSATION PRACTICES
SURVEY 1-4 (2004) available at http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfn?Section=BusinessIssues&
Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfn&ContentD=22948; see also GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note
39, at 36 (stating that many European inventors do not receive financial rewards from their employers
for their inventions).
128 Long, supra note 8, at 636 n.32; Robert Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee
Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (1999); see also Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2189
(discussing a patent assignment agreement).
129 MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 86; Merges, supra note 128, at 5.
130 Merges, supra note 128, at 38-40 (addressing a variety of reward plans offered by employers,
but noting that only a few, very large corporations offer patent-based bonuses).
31 Id. at 31.
132 See, e.g., Sauermann & Cohen, supra note 14, at 2136 (explaining, "stronger preferences for
particular extrinsic or intrinsic reward increase the marginal utility of a given unit of reward and will
increase optimal effort"). Of course, cooks and gardeners may also be responding to "cooking norms"
and "gardening norms."
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norms because inventing norms can be internalized.1 33 The environment in
which a person develops can substantially affect her actions and abilities as
an adult. 134  Scholars exploring intelligence and creativity consistently
highlight the importance of a person's "social environment-parents,
family, friends, teachers-[in which] some habits are strengthened, others
weakened or repressed.' ' 35  Admittedly, people may also invent to satisfy
innate, immutable preferences. Motivation may "arise[] from an
individual's internal inherent interest, involvement, or challenge found in a
given task or project.' 136  Nevertheless, both of these types of internal
motivation-inherent and norms-based--can motivate a person to invent.
In other words, love of inventing can simultaneously stem from a person's
inherent "nature" as well as from the "nurturing" inventing norms that a
person has internalized. At most, this potential criticism simply shows that
internal mental states can be extremely complex, involving both
environmental and inherent factors.
1 37
Il. THE EFFECT OF PATENT LAW ON INVENTING NORMS
Law and social norms are interrelated. Legal scholars have long
understood that social norms affect law.'38 For instance, racist social
norms likely contributed to the passage of laws requiring racial segregation
in education, while egalitarian social norms contributed to
desegregation. 39 More recently, legal scholars have argued that law may
affect social norms.1 40 For example, de jure racial segregation in education
133 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
134 See DAVID SHENK, THE GENIUS IN ALL OF US: WHY EVERYTHING YOU'VE BEEN TOLD
ABOUT GENETICS, TALENT, AND IQ Is WRONG 37-40 (2010) (arguing that individuals are a product of
complex interactions between genes and environmental factors including mentorship).
.3 CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 108, at 358-59; see also id. at 155-67 (discussing the impact
of childhood development on creativity); SHENK, supra note 134, at 121 ("The much larger point is that
a person's internal motivation is highly malleable and is closely tied to social reality.").
136 Mandel, supra note 15, (manuscript at 8). Internal motivations may be particularly important
with creative endeavors like inventing, because psychological research has demonstrated that
"intrinsically motivated work is more likely to produce more creative output than extrinsically
motivated work." Id.
137 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 936 (noting the complexity of internal mental states).
138 See McAdams, supra note 12, at 347-48 ("Legal scholars have always paid some attention,
sometimes enormous attention, to social or business customs, conventions, mores, and the like.").
139 For a single example of both of these competing norms at work, see 1928 Va. Acts 1213 § 680
(repealed 1971), the Virginia law requiring racial segregation in education.
140 See, e.g., Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 68
(2002) (noting the effect of motorcycle helmet laws on individual certainty of helmet safety); Timothy
R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 591 (2006) (describing the
social impact of racial segregation on understandings of race relationships); Lessig, supra note 31, at
965, 1016 (describing specifically the efforts by the Soviet government to transform the social meaning
of wearing a helmet and generally the negative social meaning ascribed to those attempting to change
social norms); McAdams, supra note 12, at 349 (stating that laws can both intentionally and
unintentionally affect social norms); Rai, supra note 82, at 86-88 (enumerating ways in which
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likely affected behavior outside of schools by reinforcing racist social
norms. 
141
In the patent context, scholars have largely ignored the impact of law
on social norms. 42 In the limited circumstances in which patent scholars
have examined the interaction between patents and social norms, they have
focused on the capacity of patent rights to undermine social norms that
promote invention. For example, some scholars have argued that granting
patents for academic discoveries undermines social norms that encourage
scientists to collaborate with each other.1 43 The following sections argue
that awarding patent rights can actually strengthen and support certain
social norms that promote invention, particularly inventing norms. As a
result, the capacity of patent rights to motivate inventors may extend
beyond the financial rewards of exclusive rights.
44
A. Patent Law and Value Judgments
Law can affect social norms by expressing a value judgment. 45
normative behavior and positive laws are interrelated); Sunstein, supra note 33, at 2043 (noting the
effect of civil rights laws on the social meaning of nondiscrimination).
141 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("Segregation of white and colored
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group.") (internal citation omitted).
142 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 13, at 1791 ("Although the law and social norms movement
is approximately two decades old, its insights have not yet penetrated deeply into the IP literature.");
see also Holbrook, supra note 140, at 578-79 (noting that patent scholars have largely ignored the
expressive function of law). Timothy Holbrook has examined whether allowing patents on certain
technology supports norms related to that technology. Id. at 579. Similarly, Shubha Ghosh has argued
that "racial categories" should not be allowed in patents because "[v]alidating racial categories in
patents may validate racist or racialist social practices." Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents,
Commercialization, and Intellectual Property Policy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 416 (2008).
143 See Bagley, supra note 88, at 239 (arguing that there is a correlation between the rise in patent
law and the continual decline in the quantity and quality of scientific discourse); Eisenberg, supra note
88, at 216 (recognizing the disincentive for researchers guided by scientific norms to publish prior to
patent protection); Grushcow, supra note 91, at 78 (attributing the increased secrecy by professors not
seeking patents to a shift in normative attitudes toward reciprocity and collegiality). The results of
these studies are inconclusive. See Strandburg, supra note 37, at 2239 ("[S]cholars may have been
overly concerned about the potential erosion of academic sharing norms .. "). The National Research
Council recently issued a report that concluded that "the expansion of faculty entrepreneurial activity
and institutional technology transfer activity at U.S. research universities has not seriously undermined
the core missions of knowledge generation and dissemination." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 40 (2011).
144 Importantly, patent law can affect the impact inventing norms have on people who do not read
statutes, regulations, and judicial opinions. For people who lack first-hand familiarity with the law,
politicians and the media provide second-hand accounts. Sunstein, supra note 33, at 2050-51.
145 The extent to which law affects norms is often called the "expressive" impact of the law to
distinguish the impact on norms from the explicit costs and benefits imposed by the law. Id. at 2024
(noting that the expressive theory of law is concerned with "making statements" as opposed to
controlling behavior directly).
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Depending upon the credibility and legitimacy of the lawmakers and the
extent to which an individual already has internalized a contrary norm, an
individual may adopt the value judgment espoused by the law. 146  For
example, a law criminalizing tax evasion may cause people to condemn tax
evasion more strongly. Even when a person has internalized a norm that is
contrary to the law, a law expressing a different value judgment may
undermine the intensity of the internalized norm. 147  Empirical studies
confirm that law can affect value judgments. For example, in one study a
first group of subjects was told that Congress had passed a certain law,
while a second group of subjects was merely told that "[s]ometimes you
hear it said" that there should be such a law. 148 When the subjects were
asked whether the law was a "good idea," the answers in the two groups
differed dramatically. In the group that had been told that the law had
already passed, fifty-seven percent of subjects responded that the law was a
"good idea," while in the group told that the law was being considered only
forty-three percent of subjects considered the law a "good idea. 14 9
Admittedly, law sometimes may be unable to affect value judgments,
particularly when the law is perceived as lacking legitimacy.' 50 Lawrence
Lessig has argued that when government attempts to change social norms,
there is a risk of causing an "Orwell effect: when people see that the
government or some relatively powerful group is attempting to manipulate
[norms], they react strongly to resist any such manipulation. ' 51
Some aspects of patent law are well suited to expressing an
endorsement of invention. In particular, the broad constitutional aspects of
patent law convey a positive evaluation of invention in general. As noted
above, the IP Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of. . . useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective... Discoveries."'152 Statutes implementing the general features
146 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 12, at 99 (discussing the relationship between the distrust of the
government and the internalization of the values of a law in the context of shaming punishments);
Geisinger, supra note 140, at 68 (describing the process of norm internalization associated with popular
understandings of wearing a motorcycle helmet); Holbrook, supra note 140, at 592 (noting the impact
laws can have on individual perceptions of societal norms); McAdams, supra note 17, at 358-59
(discussing the importance of "legitimacy" in the expressive theory of law); see also Depoorter &
Vanneste, supra note 72, at 1139-40 (discussing law, norms, and legitimacy in the copyright context).
147 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 939-40 (noting that social norms can have different intensities).
148 McAdams, supra note 17, at 368.
149 Id.
150 Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 72, at 1139 ("[P]eople obey a law less when it is considered
'unjust' or when a lawmaker is perceived as 'illegitimate."').
151 Lessig, supra note 31, at 1017; see also id. at 963, 1008 (noting that the perceived legitimacy
of a law affects its capacity to connect specific actions to broad norms). As a result of the Orwell
Effect, the government may have an incentive to minimize the extent to which its message seems to be
from the government. Id. at 1017-18.
52 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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of patent law may increase the likelihood that people embrace the value
judgment that invention is an important and worthwhile endeavor. 153 In
this respect, patent law supports inventing norms, while radical changes to
patent law, such as abolishing patent law altogether as discussed below, are
likely to undermine inventing norms.1 54  Patent laws regarding specific
technologies may also express judgments. Indeed, in the past, patent law
protection was unavailable for "inventions viewed as immoral."' 55  This
requirement has largely disappeared from patent law, though some scholars
have argued for restrictions on "immoral patents.,
156
Finally, technical, fine-grained details of patent law may be less likely
to shape values, in part because they are less value-laden. For example,
patent law currently requires the Patent Office to publish most patent
applications after eighteen months.'57 Changing that time period to
nineteen months is not likely to convey a particularly meaningful shift in
values.'58
B. Patent Law and Informnation
Law can also shape social norms by providing more information
regarding the views of other persons. A law issued from a majoritarian
government can indirectly signal the values of numerous voters, thereby
providing information regarding a widely held norm.' 59  A person can
expect to encounter others embracing a norm embodied in a law, and
others may sanction a person for failure to comply with such a norm.
160
For example, the Fair Housing Act's prohibition of discrimination in real
estate transactions on the basis of race may indicate that a person is likely
to encounter norms against racism not only in real estate transactions but
also in other contexts.1 61 In contrast, a law reflecting the work of a special
interest group provides less information regarding widely shared norms.
153 This effect may stem from perceptions about the views of other persons. See infra Section
III.B. By making invention a form of "property," patent law may also strengthen inventing norms via
the endowment effect, under which people value property they own more than property they do not.
Christopher J. Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31,
32-34 (2011).
154 See infra Section IV.A. 1.
"5 Holbrook, supra note 140, at 601.
156 See Ghosh, supra note 142, at 449 (arguing against the issuance of patents that mention racial
categories); Holbrook, supra note 140, at 592-94 (arguing against the issuance of patents regarding
sexual orientation).
17 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006).
158 The impact of law on norms can be marginal at times. Lessig, supra note 31, at 963, 1008;
McAdams, supra note 17, at 369.
159 Geisinger, supra note 140, at 64-65, 70; McAdams, supra note 17, at 358. This inference is
undermined if some people cannot or do not vote or if the validity of the vote count is suspect.
160 Geisinger, supra note 140, at 64-65, 70.
161 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
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Once again, the constitutional aspects of patent law are especially good
evidence of widely held inventing norms. These broad contours of patent
law have the iconic imprimatur of the "Founders" and do not appear to be
the product of the actions of special interests. Similarly, the long histories
of some aspects of patent law, whether as a result of statute or case law,
suggest that these provisions are not the work of legislative capture by a
particular industry. Indeed, as illustrated by the IP Clause, many aspects of
patent law date back more than two centuries, and few, if any, industry
groups boast a combination of such a lengthy history with a static view of
self-interest.
Fine-grained aspects of patent law are less likely to provide substantial
information regarding inventing norms. For example, since 1952 the
Patent Act 162 has stated that a patent shall not issue for an "obvious"
improvement on existing technology, 163 and numerous judicial opinions
have interpreted this word.' 64 In 2007, the Supreme Court adjusted the
already complicated interpretation of the word "obvious" as used in the
Patent Act.165 Such an adjustment on a narrow legal topic provides little
information regarding widely held values and beliefs. In contrast, broader
changes to patent law might impact inventing norms by indicating that
many people share the judgments underlying those changes. For instance,
in the fall of 2011, Congress enacted the most significant changes to U.S.
patent law in more than fifty years. 166 Notably, when this act was initially
introduced in the Senate, it was called the "Patent Reform Act of 2011,"
but the title of the Act was later changed changed to a more pro-invention
value-laden designation: the "Leahy-Smith America Invents Act."'167 By
associating fundamental changes to patent law with the phrase "America
Invents," the pending legislation may signal that many people consider
boosting American invention an important goal.
C. Patent Law and Social Meaning
Law can also interact with social norms by impacting the "social
162 Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.).
163 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), amended by Pub L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284(2011).
164 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) ("The emphasis on non-
obviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.").
165 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (construing the word "obvious" in 35
U.S.C. § 103, and holding, "[tihe ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination").
166See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see also
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling
the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs
Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/
president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim (stating that "the America
Invents Act represents the most significant reform of the Patent Act since 1952").
'67 157 CONG. REC. S979 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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meaning" of an action. 168 Many actions convey a social meaning in that
performing the action expresses certain attitudes and commitments.
169
Social norms define this social meaning. For example, the social meaning
of smoking has changed over time. At one point, smoking may have
expressed sensuality or independence. 170  Today, however, some interpret
smoking to indicate that a person is selfish, indulgent, and short-sighted.
171
Thus, social meanings are part of the costs and benefits associated with an
action, and some people will avoid performing an action in order to avoid
expressing the character traits or commitments connected to that action.
172
One way norms define social meaning is by classifying specific actions
as supporting or conflicting with broad, ambiguous values. 173 Some norms
are broadly phrased but do not specify which particular actions support the
broad norm.174  Law can affect social meaning by providing "concrete
guidelines for determining when a general norm has been satisfied.' 75 For
example, there is a general norm encouraging people to be a "good
friend,"'176 but there can be uncertainty regarding which actions support
that norm. A specific social norm may categorize "supporting a friend's
decision" as behavior that demonstrates a person is "being a good friend."
To the extent that someone wants to be a good friend, the specific norm
168 See Lessig, supra note 31, at 951, 965 (suggesting that these laws can be used by individuals
or groups "to advance individual or collective ends"); see also Holbrook, supra note 140, at 591 ("[flt
is beyond cavil that 'the linguistic meaning of governmental action can have a moral impact."')
(quoting Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1363, 1494 (2000)); Sunstein, supra note 12, at 949 (noting that government may use vivid images and
rhetoric as a means of affecting social norms).
169 Lessig, supra note 31, at 951 (defining "social meaning[]" as the "semiotic content attached to
various actions"); see also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 925-28.
"0 See Meghan Daum, Smoking's Sinful Sensuality in Movies, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2007, at A23
(discussing the connection between the portrayal of smoking and sensuality in film).
171 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 926 (explaining that in the United States, as opposed to other
countries, smoking cigarettes may signal "something relatively precise and very bad" about an
individual's "self-conception" and "concern for others").
172 Lessig, supra note 31, at 956-58, 1001; see also Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy,
60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1610 (2007) ("[S]ocial norms impose social costs ... ").
173 McAdams, supra note 12, at 383-86, 407-08 (suggesting that abstract norms can often be
internalized); see also Lessig, supra note 31, at 965 (explaining how government propaganda can
quickly change, thereby rapidly affecting social meaning); Sunstein, supra note 12, at 949 (noting that
government propaganda can change social meaning). Such propaganda may produce an "Orwell
Effect." See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
174 McAdams, supra note 12, at 382-86 ("Narrow, concrete norms based solely on esteem-
which are not internalized--often define the meaning of a specific behavior by defining that behavior
as complying with or violating an internalized abstract norm."); see also id. at 408 (stating that a vague
abstract norm may be "easily internalized but provides little concrete behavioral guidance," allowing
the norm to be widely shared).
171 POSNER, supra note 12, at 110-11 (noting that law may help to inform the public of how
harmful an activity is to society); McAdams, supra note 12, at 345-49.
176 See McAdams, supra note 12, at 383 (stating that to be "a loyal friend" is a sentiment that
garners unanimous agreement).
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encourages friends to support each others' decisions.
Changing a norm that specifies which actions support the general norm
can change behavior. This is particularly true if a specific behavior is re-
characterized as conflicting with the general norm. For instance, in an
effort to discourage drunk driving, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration effectively sought to affect the social meaning of
"supporting a friend's decision" by developing public service
announcements stating that "Friends Don't Let Friends Drive Drunk."
177
By characterizing the specific action of supporting a friend's decision to
"drive drunk" as not being a "good friend," the government attempted to
use social norms to reduce drunk driving. Whether such efforts succeed
depends in part upon the perceived legitimacy of the re-characterization.18
Law can also affect social meaning (and be affected by social
meaning) in the legislative context, as particular legislation is often
evaluated in terms of its impact on broader political values. For example, a
proponent of a ban on flag burning may claim that the ban will promote a
widely held value like patriotism. Similarly, opponents to such a ban may
claim that the ban would undermine the different goal of free speech. Even
if neither claim is correct (or both claims are), support for the ban can be
impacted by its perceived connection to the norms favoring patriotism or
free speech.
This framework of the interrelationship of laws, norms, and social
meaning can be used to identify ways that patent law can support inventing
norms by providing concrete guidelines for encouraging "good"
inventions. 79  For instance, the Patent Office recently implemented a
program to accelerate the patenting of discoveries "pertaining to green
technologies including greenhouse gas reduction (applications pertaining
to environmental quality, energy conservation, development of renewable
energy resources or greenhouse gas emission reduction)."' 80 The program
is intended to "accelerate the development and deployment of green
177 Drunk Driving Prevention (1983-Present), AD COUNCIL, http://www.adcouncil.org/
default.aspx?id=137 (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
178 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
179 Holbrook, supra note 140, at 598 ("Patents undisputedly can serve as the government's 'stamp
of approval."'); see also Benkler, supra note 15, at 426-27 (noting that the reward for creation of
information may be a function of "the cultural meaning associated with the act and may take the form
of actual effect on ... status perception by others or on the internal satisfaction from one's social
relations or the culturally determined meaning of one's actions"); Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note
72, at 1162 (arguing that litigation regarding copyright infringement through peer-to-peer networks
"can be viewed as a struggle to influence the social meaning of downloading and the sharing of
copyrighted work"). But see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (suggesting that the
"grant or denial of patents" on certain technology will not significantly impact the extent to which that
technology is pursued).
"'0 Green Technology Pilot Program, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/green_tech.jsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
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technology, create green jobs, and promote U.S. competitiveness in this
vital sector."'18' If this program is not perceived as industry capture,
82
patent law may be interpreted as declaring that 3"green inventions" are
particularly important to invention in our country.'
Alternatively, patent law may reduce the extent to which some
activities are interpreted as promoting general invention goals. For
example, the Supreme Court has recently considered whether methods of
conducting business should be patent eligible. 84  A one-vote majority
declined to hold that business methods were per se ineligible for patent
protection, eschewing bright-line rules and preferring instead to hold that
broad standards define the circumstances in which business methods can
be patented. 85 A decision holding that business methods were not patent
eligible might have reduced the extent to which the development of new
business methods would be perceived as furthering the broad goal of
invention. In that case, the social meaning of developing a new business
model would, to a lesser extent, include "inventing," and as a result, a
would-be developer of new business methods would have reduced
incentives stemming from inventing norms. 1
86
D. Patent Law and the Enforcement of Norms
Identifying compliance or non-compliance with norms is central to
181 Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, The U.S. Commerce Department's Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) Will Pilot a Program to Accelerate the Examination of Certain Green
Technology Patent Applications (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/
09_33.jsp.
182 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
183 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act will increase the capacity of the Patent Office to
declare that certain technological areas are particularly important. The Act will give the Director of the
Patent Office the power to prioritize the "examination of applications for products, processes, or
technologies that are important to the national economy or national competitiveness." Leahy Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 25, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The Act does not go into effect
until 2012. Id. § 35.
184 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230-31 (2010).
185 Id. at 3228-29.
186 Government can also affect social meaning through "tying," which occurs when the law
associates one action with an established social meaning with another action with a more plastic social
meaning. Lessig, supra note 31, at 1009. For example, tying is evident with celebrity endorsements of
products. Perhaps the clearest and most important example of tying in terms of patent law results from
the fact that patent law is closely "tied" to the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8., which
itself enjoys significant positive social meaning. By grounding patent law in the Constitution, the
Framers ensured that invention would be an aspect of national identity. Furthermore, the patent laws
are "tied" to the other basic congressional powers listed in Section 8 of Article I, such as the power
"[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers . I..." d , cl. 18. By associating the patent laws with the most fundamental powers of
Congress, the Constitution helps to define the social meaning of invention as positive.
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their enforcement. 187 For example, norms promoting sharing, patience, and
mutual respect may have little effect when driving because there is little
opportunity to enforce those norms; norm violators simply drive away.
Drivers may be more likely to comply with norms near their houses, where
their neighbors can easily spot violations.188  Identification of norm
compliance is crucial where external norms are involved because an actor
may be unlikely to comply with a norm if others are unaware of violations
of the norm. 189  Obtaining information necessary to enforce norms is
important even where norms are internalized because of the need to apply
and to reinforce internalized norms.
By addressing this problem of identifying and publicizing conduct that
is subject to social norms,' 90 law can facilitate the enforcement of norms.' 9'
For example, a conviction of reckless driving demonstrates a failure to
comply with norms regarding safety, responsibility, and consideration of
the safety of others. Many individuals would be embarrassed if such a
conviction became public. On the other hand, privacy laws may conceal
departures from social norms, undermining their enforcement. For
example, privacy rights related to sexual orientation can limit the
enforcement of social norms against homosexuality held by some
people.
192
One way patent law provides information that facilitates the
enforcement of inventing norms is by identifying meaningful inventions.193
To obtain a patent, an inventor must submit an application to the Patent
Office, where it will be reviewed by a patent examiner with experience and
training in the technological field to which the invention relates. 194  The
187 See McAdams, supra note 12, at 358, 361 (arguing that individuals are more likely to comply
with norms when there is a risk that their non-compliance will be detected by others); Oliar &
Sprigman, supra note 13, at 1812-13 (stating that the first stage in enforcing norms is detection).
..8 See POSNER, supra note 12, at 91 (noting the advantages of norm enforcement regimes where
enforcement costs are low); Long, supra note 8, at 664 ("For a particular behavior to be a signal, it is
only necessary for observers to believe that it serves as a signal.").
189 McAdams, supra note 12, at 358, 361-62. For example, driving patterns may be different the
closer people get to their homes not only because of the availability of information but also because
their neighbors have better opportunity to sanction behavior.
190 In Italy, for example, the names of people who do not vote are publicly displayed. POSNER,
supra note 12, at 125.
191 See id. at 34; McAdams, supra note 12, at 358 (explaining that when there is a risk that others
will know of their conduct, individuals are more likely to conform their behavior to social norms
because of a desire for esteem); Sunstein, supra note 12, at 910 (noting that norms can "operate as
'taxes' or 'subsidies' for certain conduct).
192 McAdams, supra note 12, at 429.
113 Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 225-26; Holbrook, supra note 140, at 581. That patents also
provide exclusive rights facilitates the use of patents to enforce norms. "[A] norm may ... arise ... if
the necessary information is acquired as a byproduct of some other activity." McAdams, supra note
12, at 361.
194 Admittedly, the examiner may not spend much time on the application. Mark Lemley
estimates that on average examiners spend only eighteen hours on a patent application. Mark A.
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applicant must convince the examiner that the application represents the
first discovery of the invention.195  The invention cannot have been
publicly "known or used by others in this country... before the invention
thereof by the [patent] applicant . . 196 The applicant must also
demonstrate that the invention is "useful., 197  Furthermore, the patent
applicant must demonstrate that the invention significantly contributes to
progress-even if the invention is new, it must not have been an "obvious"
extension of existing technology.' 98 Trivial novelty does not merit patent
protection. Patent law also requires inventors to disclose substantial
amounts of information regarding their inventions. 99  For example,
inventors must disclose sufficient information for a peer of "ordinary skill"
in the relevant technical art to be able to practice the invention without
undue experimentation.2 °°  Because a patent issues only after
administrative examination, the patent indicates with at least modest
credibility that these requirements for patentability have been met and thus
identifies the patentee as the creator of a meaningful new invention.201
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001) This
undermines the credibility of the examiner's decision to issue the patent to some degree. Nevertheless,
even on this account, examiners provide a nontrivial amount of time on each patent, and the decisions
of patent examiners are therefore entitled to some nontrivial amount of credibility. Indeed, examiners
are sufficiently credible that their determinations that patents are valid are granted judicial deference; a
patent can only be held invalid by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship,
131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). Moreover, many people affected by inventing norms will know little
about the thoroughness of patent examination.
195 For patents that issue after September 16, 2012, the new Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
will alter this feature of patent law so that the first person to discover an invention will only receive a
patent on that invention if that first discoverer was also the first person to file a patent application for
the invention. Pub. L. No. 112-29 §§ 3, 35, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). As a result, a patent will not always
identify the first discovery of an invention. Sometimes, a patent may identify a second discovery by an
inventor who filed a patent application before the first inventor. As an empirical matter, however, the
first inventor usually is the first to file a patent application. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41638, PATENT REFORM IN THE 112TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 7
(2011). Consequently, even under the new law, patents likely will remain useful mechanisms for
enforcing inventing norms because patents typically will identify the first person to discover an
invention. Moreover, under the new law, patents will only issue for inventions that were not "patented,
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before
the effective filing date of the claimed invention." Id. Patents therefore will remain useful mechanisms
for identifying inventions that are new to the public.
'96 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
'
9 7 
Id. § 101.
'9' Id. § 103, amended by Pub L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
199 Id. § 112, amended by Pub L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
200 See id. (stating that "any person skilled in the art" should be able to carry out the invention);
Long, supra note 8, at 678 ("[E]valuating the information contained in a patent requires special skills
that can ordinarily be obtained only through investment in expensive training.").
201 Holbrook, supra note 140, at 577; Long, supra note 8, at 650, 667-68. Eric Posner has
discussed the use of law to detect norm compliance and to communicate compliance to community
members who then enforce the norm as follows: "This division of labor might seem to make sense if
the government has a comparative advantage in detecting and communicating [norm compliance],
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Patent law also helps ensure that the correct inventor is credited with
an invention.2 °2 If a dispute arises regarding who was the first to discover
an invention, the Patent Office provides administrative procedures for
resolving the dispute.20 3 Some inventors have "initiated [such] legal
proceedings to establish . . . priority of invention for purposes of both
patent rights and scientific credit.
' 204
This identification of inventions and inventors both reinforces
internalized inventing norms and facilitates external enforcement by
publicizing discoveries to inventors' friends and colleagues. 25  Non-
technical audiences, like friends and family members, can understand the
simple fact that a patent has been granted even if the person lacks the
technical background to understand the details of the discovery.20 6 Patents
are also important in professional circles, and patentees often treat issued
patents as a credential-like a degree.20 7 When a patent is granted, the
while the community has a comparative advantage in [enforcement]." POSNER, supra note 12, at 94.
With patents, the government has a clear advantage in credibly identifying invention.
202 As noted above, The America Invents Act will change this aspect of patent law. See supra
note 195.
203 See 35 U.S.C. § 135 ("The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall determine
questions of priority of the inventions and may determine questions of patentability."). Starting in
September 2012, the new Leahy-Smith America Invents Act will change these proceedings. Pub. L.
No. 112-29 §§ 3, 35. Under the new legislation, patents will issue to the first inventor to file a patent
application rather than the first person to discover an invention. See supra note 195. As a result, the
new Act will abolish the current administrative procedure for resolving disputes between two inventors
who both claim to be the first inventor of a discovery. Id. § 3. In place of the abolished procedure, the
Act will create a new administrative procedure to resolve claims by one inventor that another person
who filed an earlier application actually "derived" his or her discovery from the first inventor. Id. § 3.
A "derivation" proceeding must be filed within one year of the issuance of a challenged patent. Id.
Thus, this new administrative procedure will provide a limited mechanism for ensuring that the correct
inventor will be credited with an invention. Furthermore, in most cases the first inventor is also the
first person to file a patent application on the discovery. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 195, at 7. In
the future, however, if patents frequently issue to second discoverers, patents may become less
effective mechanisms for enforcing inventing norms.
204 Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 228.
205 See Long, supra note 8, at 627, 647 ("Patents can serve as a means of reducing informational
asymmetries between patentees and observers.").
206 Holbrook, supra note 140, at 576 ("[P]atents act as intermediaries, translating otherwise
complicated information into simpler forms .. "); see also Dasgupta & David, supra note 45, at 505
(noting that members of the public are "incapable of evaluating the relative importance of scientific
discoveries; not only does one scientist look much like another, one publication looks pretty much like
another as well"). Indeed, a recent study reports that patents are often used to convince "friends and
families" to help fund a new business. Graham et al., supra note 122, at 1307.
207 See Long, supra note 8, at 641 n.49 (noting that companies can use patents to measure
employee productivity). The capacity of patents to facilitate the enforcement of norms evidently
applies to patent law scholars, too. For example, some patent law professors mention in their online
biographies that they are named inventors on patents. The online biography of Margo A. Bagley of the
University of Virginia Law School mentions that she "was co-inventor on a U.S. patent for improved
peanut butter." See Margo A. Bagley, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.virginia.edu/
lawweb/faculty.nsf/FHPbIi 143058 (last visited Sept. 12, 2011) (referencing U.S. Patent No. 5,230,919
(filed July 27, 1993)). Sadly, the Author currently has no patents to include in his own biography.
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2011]INVETINGNORMPatent Office provides a cover sheet with a metallic seal and ribbon. 8
There is a robust market selling specialty frames to inventors for these
certificates. 09 In addition to identifying the inventor, patents also provide
greater detail regarding the discovery to technologically sophisticated
persons.210 In these ways, patents cheaply and effectively communicate a
significant amount of information regarding attributes of the invention (and
thus of the inventor), and thereby help identify persons worthy of respect
and esteem pursuant to inventing norms.2 1' For example, Thomas Edison
was hailed for decades as America's most prolific inventor, in part because
Edison was a named inventor on more than 1000 patents.2 l2
Another manner in which patent law supports the enforcement of
inventing norms is by facilitating the use of another mechanism for
enforcing those norms: publication.213 Like patents, publication is an
effective mechanism for identifying someone who was the first to discover
214
a useful invention. Technological publications contain detailed
information, and publication dates are easily verifiable.2 5 Moreover,
technical publications reach an important group of people who enforce
inventing norms: an inventor's professional peers. The esteem granted by
those peers for the discovery of an important invention subsidizes
208 See, e.g., File: US Patent cover.jpg, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:US_Patent cover.jpg (last visited Sept. 6, 2011) (displaying an image of a patent cover
sheet).
209 Various websites offer special frames for patents. See, e.g., Iplax Patent Plaques &
Trademark Plaques, IPLAX.COM, http://www.iplax.com/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2011); PATENT AWARDS,
http://www.patentawards.com/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2011); PATENTPLAQUES.COM,
http://www.patentplaques.com/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2011); PROFESSIONAL AWARDS OF AMERICA,
LLC, http://www.uspc.com/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).210 See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text; cf Dasgupta & David, supra note 45, at 513
(discussing the use of academic research as a signal of inventive potential).
211 Long, supra note 8, at 637; see also POSNER, supra note 12, at 33 ("[T]he law can cause
changes in the inferences that people draw about a person on the basis of his actions .... ); Benkler,
supra note 15, at 424-25 (suggesting that some people may create to improve their reputations);
Sunstein, supra note 12, at 925 ("[C]onduct... has an expressive function... in the sense that people
will take the conduct to be expressing certain attitudes and commitments."). In fact, at some
universities, patenting is required for some researchers to obtain "the recognition and reward of
inventorship." Brief of Amici Curiae the Regents of the University of California, et al. at 17, Ariad
Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1248).
212 Kevin Maney, Search for the Most Prolific Inventors Is a Patent Struggle, USA TODAY, Dec.
7, 2005, at 3B.
213 See Grushcow, supra note 91, at 75 ("Historically, publication has been the primary metric of
academic success.").
214 MERTON, supra note 46, at 305-08, 316 (discussing the impact of prior publication on a claim
of priority); Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 183 (discussing scientific rewards and esteem for original
contributions); Sorenson & Singh, supra note 42, at 222 ("[P]ublished materials offer many useful
features for establishing priority ... ").
215 Sorenson & Singh, supra note 42, at 222.
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invention. 16 Without patent protection, however, publication might be less
frequent because competitors could copy technology from such
publication. Fear of such copying could prompt some inventors to protect
their discoveries by utilizing the protections of trade secret law.2 17 To
claim trade secret protection, an inventor must demonstrate the use of
reasonable measures to maintain secrecy,2 8 and the inventor therefore
would not publicize a discovery. 219 That secrecy would undermine the
application of inventing norms because it "deprives the crowd of
,220information it needs to [enforce norms]." In contrast, patent protection
does not require secrecy and is available to an inventor even if he publishes
his discovery. In fact, the inventor can wait for up to a year after
publication before filing the patent application.22'
By improving the enforcement of inventing norms, patent law can
intensify.the effect of these norms by increasing standards for compliance
with them. People laud inventors who succeed in satisfying inventing
norms, which causes potential inventors to compete for esteem. Those
who excel at satisfying inventing norms receive more respect, admiration,
and esteem than others.222 When more persons are identified as satisfying
inventing norms-whether through patenting or related publication-even
greater success is required to be exceptional. As "one person's norm
compliance raises the average [level of compliance] and lowers everyone
else's relative position,' 223 "competition for esteem can progressively raise
216 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 13, at 1832 (noting that some people create intellectual
property for non-pecuniary reasons, including to gain "prestige and celebrity"); see supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
217 Such secrecy prevents inventors from attaining recognition for their discoveries. Eisenberg,
supra note 88, at 185, 194. Some scholars argue that patent law undermines disclosure because
inventors delay publication in order to apply for patents. Id. at 216. Under U.S. patent law, an
invention cannot be patented if it was disclosed in a publication more than a year before the inventor
files the patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). Other scholars contend that patents are "a
compromise solution that is more compatible with the academic science community's norms of
disclosure than the alternative of protecting innovation rents by recourse to secrecy." Dasgupta &
David, supra note 45, at 516. Moreover, patent law may allow some inventors to publish who
otherwise would have opted for trade secret protection. In addition, the disclosure requirements of
patent law may be more robust than required by scientific norms. Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 229.
218 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § l(4)(ii) (1985); Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 191.
219 Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 194.
220 POSNER, supra note 12, at 221; McAdams, supra note 12, at 425-27 (noting that secrecy is a
way of reducing the effect of a norm).
221 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, this one-year
grace period will continue to apply to publications by the inventor. Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 3, 125 Stat.
284(2011).
222 McAdams, supra note 12, at 357, 366-69.
221 Id. at 369.
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the standard the norm imposes. 224  Such competition for esteem can
increase inventing activity and thus can progressively magnify the effect
225that patents have on people's efforts to comply with inventing norms.
IV. INCORPORATING INVENTING NORMS INTO PATENT LAW ANALYSES
Because inventors are motivated by social norms and because patent
law can affect those norms, scholars and policymakers should consider
social norms when evaluating the merits of proposed changes to patent
law.226 As part of this consideration, social norms must be integrated with
traditional economic analysis. 227 At times, the impact of law on social
norms is marginal,228 and law can be effectively evaluated using only the
traditional economic analysis. Often, however, the interaction between law
and social norms will be nontrivial. In particular, as described above,
inventing norms may be affected by patent law.
229
In general, social norms can inform patent law analysis in three
respects. First, where social norms conflict with traditional economic
incentives, policymakers should proceed more cautiously than
recommended by traditional analyses alone. Second, if social norms and
traditional financial incentives both support the same policy, there is a
stronger basis for adopting that policy. Finally, when traditional economic
analysis of the exclusive rights of patents is only minimally relevant,
norms-based analysis can provide needed guidance for determining patent
224 Id. at 366; see also SHENK, supra note 134, at 105 ("In any competitive arena, the single best
way to inspire better performance is to be surrounded by the fiercest possible competitors and a culture
of extreme excellence.").
225 That norms intensify does not mean that such a change is efficient. Competition could push
norm compliance to inefficient levels. Competition to satisfy inventing norms could prompt
investment of resources into invention even though those resources could produce greater returns in
other areas.
226 Bagley, supra note 88, at 219-23; Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 231; see also Rai, supra note
82, at 152 ("Properly understood and applied, law-and-norms analysis cautions against a mechanical
reliance on either private ordering or public regulation."). Scholars have argued that economic analysis
that ignores the impact of norms is "essentially compromised." Lessig, supra note 31, at 1020; see also
McAdams, supra note 17, at 373-74 ("[E]conomists [should] make the consideration of the expressive
consequences of law a standard component of their models.").
227 There is a substantial body of scholarship arguing that social norms sometimes promote
economic efficiency. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 29, at 9-10 (examining the informal rules that
govern the cattle herders of Shasta County, California in order to illustrate the way in which social
norms can be more effective than laws in promoting mutual advantage among neighbors); Sunstein,
supra note 12, at 918 (stating that social norms can solve collective action problems). Nevertheless,
other social norms scholars argue that the economic efficiency of social norms is indeterminate.
POSNER, supra note 12, at 176 ("In sum, one can make no presumptions about whether group norms are
efficient .... ); McAdams, supra note 12, at 424 ("[A]lthough esteem norms can be efficient, there is
no reason to think, on average, that they are."). Whether inventing norms promote efficient innovation
is a topic left for future research.
228 McAdams, supra note 17, at 369; Lessig, supra note 31, at 963, 1008.
229 See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
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policy. The next subsection explores each of these possibilities using
inventing norms, but a similar analysis would apply with other social
norms related to inventing.
A. Conflicts Between Inventing Norms and Financial Incentives
At times, concern for the effect of patent law on inventing norms may
conflict with analyses based solely on the economic value of exclusive
patent rights. For example, increasing protection afforded by patent law
could actually reduce the effect of inventing norms.230  Legal changes
strengthening exclusive rights and thereby increasing the financial benefits
of patenting could change the social meaning of inventing so that people
interpret patents as a signal of self-interested greed, rather than
praiseworthy invention.231 Undermining inventing norms may also impact
different types of technology in different ways if the strength of those
norms varies between different technologies. For instance, inventing new
medical products may yield more esteem than the development of new
business methods. If so, a change in patent law that undermines inventing
norms might affect invention incentives in medicine more than in business.
Addressing these conflicts is challenging because of the difficulty of
measuring the comparative costs and benefits related to inventing norms
vis-A-vis those related to exclusive rights.232 However, in at least one
important context, a consideration of inventing norms recommends
caution. Specifically, an analysis based on inventing norms challenges
recent scholarship recommending the most radical change to patent law
possible: abolishing patents altogether.233
230 See POSNER, supra note 12, at 4 ("[L]egal intervention will undermine or enhance the
background norms of nonlegal cooperation in complex ways."); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 13, at
1835 ("[Effective norms sometimes thrive in the absence of formal law ...."). The extent to which
law affects norms may be unclear. POSNER, supra note 12, at 8.
231 This problem may already have arisen in copyright law. Some scholars argue that Congress
and the courts have "provid[ed] an ever increasing amount of control to the copyright owner" that has
contributed to a "public[] loss of faith in copyright." Garon, supra note 72, at 1283, 1338. "The
divergence between the legal protections and the social expectations are what drive the worst of the
modem Internet piracy rhetoric and further alienate the Internet users from the copyright owners." Id.
at 1339; see also supra note 141 (discussing the impact of patent law on academic norms of sharing
information).
232 Some scholars have argued that social norms should not be considered in legal analysis
because predicting outcomes based on social norms is difficult. Geisinger, supra note 140, at 50-55;
see also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 936 ("[A]n excessively detailed account of [human motivation]
may make predictions impossible.").233 
E.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT
35 (2004).
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1. Arguments for Abolishing or Radically Restructuring Patent Law
Recently, some patent scholars have argued that the costs of exclusive
rights exceed the benefits and that, therefore, patent law should be
abolished or at least radically restructured.134 Almost certainly, exclusive
rights impose three types of costs on invention. First, there are the
administrative costs of operating the patent system. Currently, the fees
paid by the applicants fund the operations of the Patent Office.235
Second, one person's independent efforts to invent may infringe on
existing patent rights, so that the first inventor faces costs from the
exclusionary rights of others. 36 As a result of concerns regarding
infringement, inventors may be deterred from pursuing new inventions or
improving existing inventions, particularly in technologically crowded
fields.237 Consequently, patents may "increase[] the cost of creation.2 38
Because of this type of cost, some scholars have questioned whether patent
law actually encourages invention. For example, Michele Boldrin and
David K. Levine have argued that this cost is not justified by sufficient
concomitant gain resulting from economic incentives to invent provided by
the exclusive rights of patents.239 In their view, patent law is "an
unnecessary evil,, 240 and "abolishing intellectual property protection is the
only socially responsible thing to do. 24 1
Third, patent infringement lawsuits impose substantial legal costs on
all parties z42 and some scholars assert that these costs exceed the benefits
provided by patent law. For example, James Bessen and Michael J.
Meurer argue that during the late 1990s, patents "likely provided a net
disincentive for innovation" outside of the chemical and pharmaceutical
industries. 243 They conclude that without the then-existing patent system,
"the rate of innovation and technological progress might have been even
greater, perhaps much greater."244  Their data "suggest the rather
remarkable conclusion that in most industries innovators as a whole would
be better off without a patent system. 2 45 In light of their analysis, Bessen
234 id.
235 See infra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
236 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 130 ("[A]n innovator might inadvertently infringe upon
someone else's patent.").
237 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 233, at 76 (noting that patents may force a person to "abandon
particular products").
238 BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 8, at 11.
239 id.
240 id.
241 Id. at 243-44.
242 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 131-32. The Patent Act does provide for fee shifting in
limited circumstances. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
243 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 141-42.
'441d. at 146.
245 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 8, at 31.
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and Meurer declare current patent law to be a "failure"2 46 and contend that
"fundamental institutional deficiencies call for fundamental institutional
change."
247
2. The Incompleteness of Arguments Against Current Patent Law
Boldrin, Levine, Bessen, and Meurer are not alone in their claims that
the current patent system is fundamentally flawed. Other prominent
scholars also conclude that the patent system is "in crisis ' 24 8 and
"broken." 249 All of these critiques compare economic costs and benefits of
the patent system, but these scholars quantify benefits based solely on the
economic value of exclusive patent rights. Inventing norms are ignored.
As a result, the analyses underlying the attacks on the efficacy of the patent
system are incomplete.250
For example, in arguing that the net cost of the patent system is less
than the net benefits, Bessen and Meurer calculate the value of patents by
using the rate at which patent owners pay maintenance fees to maintain
their patents l.2 5  To maintain their patent rights, patent owners must pay
fees after 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years. 2  These fees currently range from $490
to $4110. Bessen and Meurer note that the majority of patents expire
prematurely because patent owners do not pay renewal fees even though
the fees are not large. From these data, Bessen and Meurer conclude that
most patents "are not worth more than a few thousand dollars. 253
Comparing the total value of patents (as determined by this approach) to
the total costs of litigation, Bessen and Meurer conclude that "patents
likely provided a net disincentive for innovation for the firms who fund the
lion's share of industrial [research and development]; that is, patents tax
[research and development]. 254
This analysis is incomplete, and thus potentially invalid, because it
ignores inventing norms and considers only the economic value of
246 In fact, Bessen and Meurer titled their book Patent Failure. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note
22.
247 Id. at 231. Bessen and Meurer, however, stop short of recommending that patent law be
abolished. They argue instead that substantially revised patent law can promote invention even if
current laws fail to meet that goal. Id. at 167, 173, 216.
248 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 8, at 3.
249 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 233, at 18-19.
250 See Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 231 ("Legal rules are more likely to succeed in influencing
the behavior of scientists if they resonate with scientists' conception of appropriate behavior than if
they call for counterintuitive departures from the norms of science."); Long, supra note 8, at 635 ("[A]
view that defines the value of patent rights solely in terms of the use and control of resources rests on
an impoverished understanding of the role patents can play.").
251 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 99-100.
252 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)-(g) (2010).
253 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 100.
254Id. at 144.
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exclusive rights. This omission is important because a patent helps to
enforce inventing norms regardless of whether it expires early because of
failure to pay maintenance fees. For example, a patent can signal to an
inventor's friends and family that the inventor should be esteemed even if
it expires years before its maximum term of twenty years from the date of
application.255 Moreover, the potential esteem from social norms may be
substantial and may extend for many years beyond the maximum term
because the extent to which an inventor is esteemed likely correlates to the
lasting significance of the invention, not the patent. Thomas Edison and
Alexander Graham Bell are still lauded for their pioneering inventions
even though the patents on the light bulb and the telephone expired long
ago. Likewise, Michael Jackson's patent expired early because he failed to
pay modest maintenance fees,256 but journalists nevertheless reported on
the existence of the expired patent in accounts of Jackson's death. Because
of such continuing effects, inventing norms lack the temporal limitation of
the exclusive rights granted by patent law. Indeed, a patent often will not
allow an inventor to fully capture the economic benefits of the invention
because patents last for only a "limited period,"257 which under current law
is typically limited to twenty years after the filing of the patent
258application. But the benefits of the invention based on inventing norms
supplement the economic value during the patent term and may extend
well beyond that time.
Although empirical measurement of the impact of patent law on social
norms is likely impossible, there are at least two reasons to believe that
patents may provide nontrivial encouragement to invention via inventing
norms. First, many patents produce no direct revenue whatsoever,259 yet
inventors continue to seek patent protection in record numbers. 260
255 Bessen and Meurer also value patents based on "the market value of public firms to their
assets, including their stock of patents." Id. at 104. Norms favoring invention, however, bestow social
subsidies on inventors, not shareholders. Even after a patent is assigned to a corporation, the inventor
is credited in the patent document itself with the discovery. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying
text. Shareholders cannot appropriate the respect and admiration an inventor receives from friends,
families, and colleagues.
256 Vergano, supra note 7, at 2D.
257 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Benkler, supra note 15, at 430 (noting that the marginal
value of an agent's action can sometimes wind up less than the transaction costs).
258 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
259 See Lemley, supra note 194, at 1507 (suggesting that only a small percentage of the patents
issued each year are licensed in exchange for royalties); Long, supra note 8, at 626 (arguing that poor
appropriability is likely to lead to little private value); Sichelman, supra note 8, at 343 ("About half,
probably more, of all patented inventions in the United States are never commercially exploited.").
260 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS (2010) [hereinafter U.S.
PATENT STATISTICS] (showing the number of patent applications and grants every year since 1963
including 520,277 applications in 2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/
taf/us stat.pdf.
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Alternate explanations exist for the explosion in patent applications,2 6' but
one plausible explanation is that the value of patents based on inventing
norms is sufficient to encourage patenting, at least in combination with the
chance of other financial benefits.262 Second, as noted above, many patents
are assigned to corporations by employees, and those employee-inventors
receive little, if any, financial reward for their discoveries.263 As a result,
even when patents yield some financial gain, inventors frequently do not
enjoy those benefits. Nevertheless, partly because of inventing norms,
employees invent.2 4
To determine the efficacy of patent law in promoting invention, all
costs and benefits, including those related to social norms, must be
considered.265 Moreover, although the net effects of substantial changes to
patent law on all social norms are uncertain, such changes could undermine
inventing norms.266 Abolishing patent law could be viewed as evidence
that invention is no longer important in America, thereby reducing the
social incentives to pursue technological discoveries. Scholars like Bessen
and Meurer may ultimately be correct that, all things considered, current
patent law provides a disincentive to invent. However, because these
analyses ignore the interplay between patent law and inventing norms,
additional research and analysis is needed before their arguments can be
used as the basis for abolishing or substantially restructuring patent law.267
B. Harmony Between Inventing Norms and Financial Incentives
In some instances, an inventing-norms analysis of patent law can
reinforce a traditional economic analysis, providing greater confidence in
the recommendations of both analyses. For example, both analytical
approaches recommend giving the Patent Office greater control over its
own funding. Currently, the Patent Office is funded solely through "user
261 For example, even if the expected value for patents is negative, people may obtain them due to
game-theoretic effects.
262 Some scholars suggest that when the financial effects of law are unclear, the normative
concerns may become more prominent. Cass Sunstein notes that "good statements are worth
supporting when judgments about consequences are unclear." Sunstein, supra note 33, at 2047.
263 See supra notes 122, 126-30 and accompanying text.
2
" See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. As noted above, internal motivation unrelated
to social norms may also encourage employees to invent. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.26
5 See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 2045-46 (using emission trading laws to illustrate the
importance of evaluating the cost and benefits of laws on social norms); see also Long, supra note 8, at
637 (arguing that patent analysis should consider both the economic effects of exclusive rights as well
as other signaling functions of patent law).
266 See supra Sections I.A-C.
267 If scholars demonstrate that patents actually undermine invention, social norms favoring
patenting may erode. See McAdams, supra note 12, at 395 (discussing two ways that criticism can
provoke rapid normative change). In this sense, criticism of the patent system can actually impact
norms related to invention.
fees," including fees paid by patent applicants.268 Congress, however, has
the power to divert some of these fees to other parts of government.269
Since 1990, Congress has diverted more than $700 million in Patent Office
fees to other government programs.27 ° In more recent years, Congress has
allowed the patent office to keep substantially all of its fees, 27' but the
threat of fee diversion remains. Indeed, in 2010, Congress initially planned
to divert more than $100 million in Patent Office fees to other areas of
government. Ultimately, Congress passed an additional appropriations bill
restoring $129 million to the Patent Office's budget.272
A traditional economic analysis of patent law indicates that the Patent
Office probably should be able to utilize all of the fees paid by inventors.
From an economic perspective, requiring patent applicants and owners to
pay for other government programs operates as a tax on one aspect of
innovation and thus likely slows technological progress.
An inventing-norms analysis also indicates that the Patent Office
should be able to keep its fees. Requiring inventors to subsidize other parts
of government may weaken inventing norms by indicating that inventing is
less important to society. Indeed, commentators have criticized fee
diversions as elevating "pet projects" and congressional "largess" above
"an agency that was already incapacitated by more than a decade of
congressional raids on its fees. 273 Halting the diversion of funds from the
Patent Office may signal increased value of invention by society.2 74
268 H.R. REP. No. 109-372, at 5 (2005); see also Administration Says Patent Law Change Will
Spur U.S. Economy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 16, 2011, 12:46 PM),
http://news.businessweek.com/article.asp?documentKey= 1376-LRL22G07SXKXO1-ORB7NTKPO04S
792519LK7EKQ02.
269 See H.R. REP., supra note 268, at 5 (describing one such diversion of the surcharge fees by
Congress to other programs).
270 Id. at 6.
271 Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office's Troubled Quest
for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2057 (2009); see also Letter from Michael K. Kirk,
Exec. Dir., Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n, to Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate (Aug. 13,
2007) (advocating for the creation of a revolving fund that would allow the USPTO to continue to
retain and use all of its fees), available at http://www.aipla.org/Advocacy/o20Shared%2ODocuments/
TES_2007-08-13_ 11OCMcConnell-AdequateFunding-Kirk.pdf.
272 United States Patent and Trademark Office Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
111-224, 124 Stat. 2385 (2010).
273 John Schmid, Congress Deals Funding Blow to Patent Office: Budget Strips $100 Million
Provision for Backlogged Agency, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 29, 2009, at Al. Indeed, fee
diversions have "repeatedly outraged the patent community." Tony Dutra, House Appropriations Bill
Would Give PTO Access to $2.7 Billion and Excess in FY2012, 82 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
384, 384 (2011).
274 Indeed, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act may strengthen inventing norms in this respect.
When the Act takes effect in September 2012, it will provide the Patent Office with greater security in
retaining fees. Pub. L. No. 112-29 §§ 22, 35, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The Act will allow Congress to
withhold some of the fees from the Patent Office but those fees cannot be spent on other government
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Where two traditional analyses conflict with one another, an inventing-
norms analysis may help scholars and policymakers by supporting one
traditional analysis more than another. For example, some patent scholars
criticize the quality of patents issued by the Patent Office on the ground
that many issued patents do not address new inventions and instead
describe previously known technology or trivial advances over existing
technology.275 Some scholars contend that such "low quality" patents are
problematic; 276 other scholars view these patents as the acceptable result of
an efficient use of resources.277 However, the second view relies on the
fact that relatively few patents produce financial benefits via litigation or
licensing.278 Benefits stemming from inventing norms are not considered.
If the benefits of inventing norms are considered, it may become efficient
to invest greater resources in improving the quality of patents because,
when the Patent Office erroneously issues low quality patents and the
existence of such errors becomes known, the patent system may become
less effective in supporting inventing norms.279  For example, as patents
become less reliable evidence that patentees have satisfied inventing
norms, they become less effective in reinforcing those norms.
C. Inventing Norms and Trivial Financial Incentives
In those instances where the economic effects of the exclusive rights of
patents are only marginally relevant to an issue of patent law,
considerations of inventing norms are more essential. One such issue is
the role of the independent inventor in patent law politics. Currently,
patent law provides independent inventors with assistance in obtaining
programs. Id. § 22. Instead, unused fees remain in an account with the Treasury and can only be
"expended only for obligation and expenditure by the [Patent] Office." Id.
275 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
276 See Lemley, supra note 194, at 1495 n.1 (collecting criticisms of the quality of issued patents).
2 7 7See id. at 1531-32.
27 See id. at 1501-08 (discussing the fate of unlitigated patents).
279 Eric Posner has argued that social norms associate social signals with information that is
difficult to observe. Under a "separating equilibrium," the social signal is used to differentiate those
with hidden "good" characteristics from those with hidden "bad" characteristics. POSNER, supra note
12, at 19, 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). To obtain a separating equilibrium, those with
disfavored hidden characteristics must be unable or unwilling to send the signal. Id. at 21-23, 26. In
contrast, with a pooling equilibrium both the "good" and the "bad" send the signal, so that the audience
receiving the signal cannot differentiate between the two groups. As a result, to create a separating
equilibrium, the signal must be costly to send, particularly for "bad" persons. Id. at 26; see also Long,
supra note 8, at 648-49 (discussing signaling theory). In Posner's terminology, high-quality patents
may serve as signals creating a separating equilibrium between those who excel at satisfying inventing
norms and those who do not. Low quality patents, in contrast, create a pooling equilibrium in which
patenting provides less information about the patentee.
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patents-independent inventors pay smaller fees in the Patent Office,280
and the Patent Office's website provides detailed information to assist
independent inventors. 281' This special treatment helps reduce the financial
and informational obstacles to independent inventors obtaining patents.
Many patent law scholars, however, dismiss the inventive contribution of
independent inventors and contend that contrary claims are "frequently
hyped and distorted.
2 82
Despite these criticisms, references to independent inventors often
arise in discussions of patent law, particularly patent reform.28 3 Members
of Congress often mention "independent inventors" in justifying both
opposition to and support of legislative patent reform. For example, in
2010, Senator Mary Landrieu stated that patent reform "is of great
importance to small businesses and independent inventors
everywhere ...., In contrast, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher argued
the same year that "so-called patent reform ... will undercut America's
,,285independent inventors. When addressing potential changes to patent
law, the Patent Office has also focused on independent inventors. In 2007,
the Patent Office's Commissioner for Patents testified before Congress that
"[t]he contribution from small and minority business and independent
inventors to America's innovation and technological growth cannot be
overstated. 28 6 In 2010, the Director of the Patent Office likewise declared
that that recent proposals to reform patent law are "good for the
independent inventor.
2 87
Social norms analysis provides a way to address this varied and
divergent assessment of independent inventors. More specifically, an
28 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2006) (stating that an "independent inventor" shall have fees "reduced by
50 percent"). The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act establishes even lower fees for particularly small
and unsophisticated patent applicants. Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 10, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
281 See Independent Inventors, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/
inventors/independent/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
282 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 166; see GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 39, at 23
(reporting that only 7.81% of European patentees are self-employed).
283 Independent inventors were also mentioned by members of Congress in connection with the
recent act restoring to the Patent Office's budget the fees it collected See, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. E1500
(2010) (statement of Rep. Johnson). Small inventors were also addressed by congresspersons in
connection with legislation supporting small businesses. See, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. S6464 (statement of
Sen. Cardin) ("Innovation is the way for America to stay on the cutting edge. More patents and more
copyrights are created through small businesses per employee than a larger company.").
284 156 Cong. Rec. S1313 (2010) (statement of Sen. Landrieu).
285 Id. at HI 159-60 (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher).
286 Full Committee Hearing on the Importance of Patent Reform on Small Business: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 46 (2007) (Statement of John J. Doll, Comm'r for
Patents, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office).
287 David J. Kappos, Patent Reform: Good for Independent Inventors and Small Businesses,
INVENTORSEYE (Feb. 2010), http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/independent/eye/201002/kapposletter.
html.
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analysis of inventing norms justifies provisions of patent law and political
rhetoric favoring independent inventors because the independent inventor
plays an iconic role in inventing norms. Though independent inventors
may have little direct impact on invention, independent inventors are often
widely celebrated in those instances in which they are successful. 288 Such
personalized tales of invention are more accessible narratives than the
accomplishments of faceless corporate research teams; people can
empathize with independent inventors. Because inventing norms help
foster invention, it is good policy to adopt provisions of patent law that
support independent inventors and thus help support inventing norms,
regardless of whether such provisions otherwise have any demonstrable
effects on invention.289
V. CONCLUSION
Patent law strives to encourage invention. Because invention is a
product of human behavior, patent law must consider all factors that
motivate humans to invent. Without a doubt, inventors can be motivated
by the financial reward of exclusive rights, particularly where corporations
are involved. Nevertheless, people are also motivated by evaluative
treatments of their behavior-i.e., by social norms. In particular, social
290
norms that label invention as "esteem worthy" can encourage invention.
Although patent law encourages invention through the economic incentive
of exclusive rights, patent law also promotes invention by facilitating the
enforcement of inventing norms.291 In evaluating the patent system, patent
scholars often overlook the role of inventing norms; as a result, scholars
have been blind to the effect of patent law on these norms.
Law and social norms often interact in complex ways; determining the
impact of law on social norms is difficult.292  Efforts to shape norms
through law may backfire. 293  Nevertheless, patent law cannot avoid
affecting norms, and ignoring social norms will not make them less
288 For example, Stephen Wozniak and Steve Jobs are often complimented for their invention of a
personal computer in a garage. Astebro, supra note 68, at 226 n. 1.
289 The concept of solo inventors may also resonate with other social norms, such as norms
favoring independence and self-sufficiency. See Shane, supra note 36, at 30 (arguing that
individualism fosters innovation).
290 See McAdams, supra note 12, at 358 (explaining how the desire for esteem can produce a
norm).
291 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 958 ("A well-functioning society needs many norms that make
it rational for people, acting in their self-interest, to avoid collective action problems.").
292 Efforts to shape norms through law may produce unintended consequences. See POSNER,
supra note 12, at 118, 124, 129. For example, efforts to change norms regarding drug use through
Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" campaign were unsuccessful. Id. at 32.
293 Sunstein, supra note 12, at 919 ("Efforts by private or public authorities to stigmatize certain
acts may have the opposite effect.").
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relevant.294 Consequently, scholars and policymakers who seek to promote
invention through patent law must consider the impact of legal changes on
norms in general and inventing norms in particular. At times, as in the
case of proposals to abolish the patent system, analyses of inventing norms
will conflict with traditional analyses and recommend caution. In other
contexts, analyses of inventing norms strengthen traditional economic
analyses and provide added support for policy recommendations. Where
the traditional analysis of patent law provides little guidance, an analysis of
inventing norms can help determine invention policy.
The impact of these norms on national technology policy goals will
likely be at the forefront of future research regarding inventing norms.
International treaties have greatly streamlined the procedures that a foreign
citizen can use to obtain a U.S. patent,295 and recent statistics released by
the Patent Office demonstrate that foreign inventors now receive more U.S.
patents than U.S. inventors.296 Allowing foreign inventors to obtain the
exclusive rights of a U.S. patent may foster invention, but these rights may
be poor mechanisms for helping the United States excel in a global
technology market. In contrast to the economic value of exclusive rights,
the incentives provided by social norms might be difficult to acquire by
foreign inventors. "[D]ifferent populations can have different and
conflicting norms.'29 v Cultures without strong norms favoring invention
294 See id. at 913 ("[G]overnment ... cannot avoid affecting social norms ....").
295 See, e.g., Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231
(providing for initial international patent applications where the actual countries of filing must
subsequently be determined within a certain period of time); Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (allowing applicants to file for
patent protection in other contracting states within a certain period of time of filing a first application in
a country that is a party to the treaties).
296 In 2009, the Patent Office issued 82,382 patents to U.S. citizens and 84,967 to foreign
inventors. See U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, supra note 260.
297 McAdams, supra note 12, at 388; see also Geisinger, supra note 140, at 44 (providing an
overview of Lessig and Sunstein's work on expressive law theories); Lessig, supra note 31, at 954-55
("[Meanings] differ across communities and individuals."); Sunstein, supra note 12, at 926 (stating that
the meanings of acts are a "function of context and culture"). Indeed, some parts of the United States
are considered more inventive than others even though they are governed by the same substantive
patent law. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 586-88 (1999)
(comparing economic activity between the high technology regions of Silicon Valley, California, and
Route 128 in Massachusetts). Per capita patenting varies from state to state. Compare Annual
Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1,
2000 to July 1, 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2010), with ELEC. INFO. PROD. Dtv., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT
COUNTS BY COUNTRY/STATE AND YEAR: UTILITY PATENTS JANUARY 1, 1963-DECEMBER 31, 2010 1
(2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst-utl.pdf. In the past decade,
Idaho has produced the most patents per capita. Social norms also vary from place to place.
Geography may be very important to invention because local norms may "matter most." McAdams,
supra note 16, at 373. Interestingly, legal scholars have not analyzed from the perspective of social
norms whether different places value invention more than others. See Sorenson & Singh, supra note
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may provide smaller incentives for people to invest in developing new
technologies.298  Indeed, one sociological study suggests that U.S.
inventors may be affected by inventing norms more than inventors in some
other countries.299 Inventing norms, thus, may be part of the "inherited
social capital" of the United States,300 and strong inventing norms-as
supported by patent law-may help the United States to compete in global
technology markets.0
42, at 220 (noting that "inventors, like most people, primarily interact with others that live and work in
close proximity to them").
298 In a sense, "culture" is the "collection of incentives presented by different social meanings
regulating... behavior." Lessig, supra note 31, at 1030.299 See Walsh & Nagaoka, supra note 39, at 23 (contrasting motivations between U.S. inventors
and Japanese inventors).
300 Lessig, supra note 3 1, at 1000.
301 Some other countries may also benefit from inventing norms. See supra notes 106, 109 & 119
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44:369
